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1Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to identify cultural variables which may drive social unrest and the role
these variables play in the communication of dissatisfaction. Data for this study was obtained by
consolidating  two  different  data  sets.  One  set  of  data  came  from ‘The  GLOBE Study’ which
analyses responses from middle-management about cultural values in 62 societies. The second data
set is from the ‘The Economist Intelligence Unit’ (EIU) which analyses political and economical
variables in over 150 countries, with the aim to assess the risk of social unrest for each of those
countries.
In the first part of the study, we conduct a literature review which examines social unrest at a micro
level,  paying  particular  attention  to  the  communication  and  social  movements  theories.  In  the
second part  of the study we perform a data analysis, which will investigate trends and patterns
which appear from the amalgamation of the GLOBE study and the EIU political instability index. In
the results and discussion, we analyse those patterns which indicate what cultural values play a role
in the communication of dissatisfaction and contribute to the risk of social unrest. These values are
related  to  the  dimensions  of:  Uncertainty  Avoidance,  Institutional  Collectivism,  Performance
Orientation  and Future  Orientation.                                                
2Acknowledgements
We would  like  to  extend  a  massive  thank  you  to  Björn  Johansson  who helped  us  crunch  the
numbers. The numbers could have been very overwhelming otherwise.
A big  thank  you  to  Göran  Karlsson,  our  supervisor,  who  guided  us  through  the  process  by
specifying what needed clarification in the copious amount of information.
Finally, a big thank you to our proofreaders, Maureen Povey and Cyril Henriquet, who pointed out
those small mistakes which our busy eyes skimmed over. 
3Contents
Introduction 4
Aim of the Study 7
Problem Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Significance . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Originality of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Hypothesis. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .8
Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . 8
Overview of the study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Scope of the Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Theoretical Framework 10
Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .  . . . . . . .. . . . 10
What is Culture?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Cultural Patterns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 11
Taxonomies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The GLOBE study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 11
What is Social Unrest? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .  . . . 15
The Political Instability Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Literature Review 17
Social Movements theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .  . . 17
Communication theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .  18
Methodology 20
Approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 20
Merging. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .  . .. . . . . . . . . .  . . . 21
Figures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 25
Data Analysis 28
DCD values and the cultural dimensions graphs .  . . . . . . . 28 
Results 39
Discussion 41
Meaning of the findings  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Relation to Social Science Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 46
Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 47
Suggestions for further research  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 48
Conclusion 49
Reference List 50
Appendices 54
4Introduction
Social unrest has many synonyms - uprising, revolt, rebellion, revolution and insurgence; these are
just a few alternatives which describe the range of activity involved. In general, social unrest, like
other forms of social movements, is a term which describes a group of people gathering together to
challenge the status quo. Many people involved in the movement are tired of current conditions and
hope to produce an outcome which will positively affect their quality of life. However, this unrest
may cause a disruption to the very fabric of society. 
As key terms,  social  unrest  and its  synonyms are  being  used more and more in  current  affair
articles.  In  ‘Protest  in  a  connected  society’,  Peter  Spinks  (2013)  wrote;  “From  New  York  to
Istanbul, and Rio to Tunis, waves of social unrest have been sweeping across the world”. Though
the magnitude of warfare has fallen to its lowest levels since 1961, “[s]ocietal warfare has been the
predominant mode of warfare since the mid-1950s; increasing steeply and steadily through the Cold
War period. (Center for Systematic Peace, 2011, p.4)”. Nafeez Ahmed commented on this increase
in  unrest,  on  March  1,  2014.  He  wrote;  “2013  and  early  2014,  has  seen  a  persistence  and
proliferation of civil unrest on a scale that has never been seen before in human history. This month
alone has seen riots kick-off in Venezuela, Bosnia, Ukraine, Iceland, and Thailand” (Ahmed, 2014). 
The apparent causes,  or drivers,  for these outbreaks of unrest  differ.  Kekic (2013) states;  “The
reasons for the protests vary. Some are direct responses to economic distress (in Greece and Spain,
for example). Others are revolts against dictatorship (especially in the Middle East). A number also
express the aspirations of new middle classes in fast-growing emerging markets (whether in Turkey
or Brazil)” (see appendix A).
However, it is also evident that ‘Globalism’ has had an impact in this recent wave. Westaway (2012,
p.132) believes “that globalization has a clear and significant social dimension which encompasses
security, cultural identity, social welfare, individual identity, and social cohesiveness.” Westaway
(2012) continues with a discussion on how the liberalisation of financial and trade markets have
caused political and economical changes which institutions have been inadequately prepared for.
“This  undermining  of  authority  in  turn  increases  violence,  corruption  and  increasing  political
dissatisfaction and unrest” (UN, 2011, as cited by Westaway, 2012, p.133-134). Natarajan (2011,
p.89)  adds  to  this  observation  by  commenting  “[r]ising  aspirations  release  social  energy  and
dynamism for new initiatives and more rapid progress. At the same time, if the rising aspirations
and actual results do not match and the gap between expectations and reality becomes too wide,
expectation turns into disappointment, discontent and in some cases violence.”.
What  is  evident  from figure 1,  is  that  social  unrest  can be the cause of,  or a  consequence of,
different factors.  Jovanović et  al  (2012, p.13) expand on this by stating “[s]ocial  unrest  can be
grouped into this  framework of systemic risks.  It  can be a cause of risk to others,  it  can be a
consequence of experiencing risk (for example a terrorist threat) or the manifestation of such a risk
(the actual terrorist attack) or it can be a promoter of a risk chain”. 
5Figure 1 - diagram from the OECD report on social unrest (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.12)
Whilst  these causes and/or  consequences appear to  affect the macro level of society,  Natarajan
(2011, p.89) addresses drivers at a micro level by writing, “[d]iscontent is an indication that people
are no longer resigned or satisfied with mere survival. It replaces a feeling of resignation with an
active  aspiration  for  more”.  Jovanović  et  al  (2012,  p.43)  add  to  this  concept  by  writing
“[d]issatisfaction can arise  out  of physical,  social  or psychological  reasons.  Even if  people are
dissatisfied  nothing will  happen unless  that  dissatisfaction  is  displayed in  some kind of  public
arena”. This display of dissatisfaction is a process which involves communication with others and is
the first step of action in the stages of social unrest. The degrees of escalation is further explained in
figure 2.
Figure 2 - diagram from the OECD report on social unrest (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.44)
6Communication is in fact a key component for each stage of social unrest. It is the means through
which individuals affiliate themselves with networks that allow them “to make their voice heard in
society” (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.51). Della Porta & Diani (2006, p. 126) add to this by stating that
“activists create new channels of communication among them and increase the scope for promoting
common campaigns”. Klandermans (1992) distinguished three processes of “meaning construction
in the movement context: public discourse, persuasive communication, and consciousness raising
during episodes of collective action” (as cited in Johnston & Klandermans, 1995, p.10). 
Communication  lays  at  the  core  of  social  unrest  and  the  movements  which  ensue.  It  impacts
“[s]ymbols,  values,  meaning,  icons,  and  beliefs  [which]  are  adapted  and  moulded  to  suit  the
movement's aims and frequently are injected into the broader culture via institutionalization and
routinization” (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995, p.9). Johnston & Klandermans (1995, p.9) believe
that “[a] performative view of culture stresses that social movements are not just shaped by culture;
they also shape and reshape it.” In the more recent years, Johnston (2009, p.4) has added to this
understanding by stating that “[n]arratives, text,  discourse, metaphor,  actors, and performances”
need to be investigated further “to explain how social movements come into being and develop”. 
The creation of a communication culture within social movements means that there are not just
face-to-face  interactions  with  other  movement  participants  but  interactions  with other  forms  of
communication such as “mainstream media” and “the activists' own media” (Cammaerts, Mattoni &
McCurdy (2013, p.80 - 81) . 
Communication  cultures  in  both  social  movements  and social  unrest  are  complex entities.  The
values and beliefs which these communication cultures draw upon are often based within the very
society they exist. However, the beliefs and the values of the individuals may be “distinct from the
broader culture” meaning that “shifts in beliefs [can] cause social change” (Johnston,  2009, p.4).
These shifts in values and beliefs which result in a change to practices in the broader culture is what
this study is primarily concerned with and will be further investigated. 
7Aim of the Study
Problem scope
Studies on social unrest generally focus on the political, economical or environmental factors that
can lead to, or be the consequence of, such uprisings. Little is written about the effect of culture in
these situations. As Hawkes (2001, p.3) states, “culture is both the medium and the message – the
inherent values and the means and the results of social expression. Culture enfolds every aspect of
human intercourse: the family, the education, legal, political and transport systems”. This statement
encompasses the importance of culture and centres it at the core of society. Hawkes (2001, p.3) adds
“culture is not the decoration added after a society has dealt with its basic needs. Culture is the basic
need – it is the bedrock of society”. As it may be implied, societies are fundamentally comprised of
people, and the values these people hold. In times of hardship, these cultural values will impact how
people within a culture react to external stimuli. Indeed in their report on ‘Social Unrest’ for the
OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, Jovanović et al. (2012) acknowledge culture as a
factor in driving social instability. On page 11 they state, “Social unrest is hence cause and effect in
a complex risk web that links technological, natural, social and cultural drivers” (Jovanović et al,
2012). For these reasons, we believe it is necessary to investigate the role of culture in the risk of
social unrest.
Significance
Barinaga (1996, p.1) confirms this expanding significance of culture in many cross-disciplines by
stating;  “[w]hat initially was restricted to anthropology, has been growing, now being the object of
study in many other disciplines. Economics, management, politics and psychology are only some
examples of it.” However, research which focuses explicitly on culture as a driving force in social
unrest appears to be scant. Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales (2006) believe this is because it is difficult
to quantify culture. On page 23 they state, “[u]ntil recently, economists have been reluctant to rely
on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. Much of this reluctance stems from
the very notion of culture: it is so broad and the channels through which it can enter economic
discourse so ubiquitous (and vague) that it  is  difficult  to design testable,  refutable hypotheses”
(Guiso et al, 2006). Understandably, it is difficult to separate economics and politics from culture
since  there  is  a  dual  relationship  and  interdependence.  However  as  Hawkes  (2001,  p.1)  states
“[t]here is a growing recognition among those who influence the way our society manages itself
that economic benchmarks alone are an insufficient framework upon which to evaluate progress or
to plan for the future”. Since there appears to be a call to investigate the role of culture in social
unrest, this study will attempt to develop a method in order to achieve this. 
Originality of the research
There are a number of studies which assess the risk of social unrest. Many of them are based in
analysing variables which are quantifiable, such as government type, GDP and social provisions.
Whilst these studies use verified methods of predicting the chances of uprisings, they lack a certain
‘human’ quality about how the population feel about these events and about what drives people to
participate in social unrest. It is at this level - the micro level - we believe that cultural values are
the most  important.  This study will  use data  from the GLOBE study as a  way of  ‘measuring’
cultural values and practices, and amalgamate these variables with their respective countries in the 5
different  risk of social  unrest  categories,  as  established by the the Economist  Intelligence Unit
(EIU). This provides us with a way of ‘quantifying’ culture and investigating the impact values may
have on the drivers of social unrest. 
8Hypothesis
We believe that social unrest in any given country is driven by many aspects. These include
politics and economics. However, we also believe that there is a degree of influence from the gap
between cultural values - what people define as important in their culture, and cultural practices -
the way people normally behave during their everyday communication. Using theories developed in
the social sciences, we will explain how gaps between these two cultural variables can lead to the
communication  of  dissatisfaction.  This  in  turn  will  help  explain  why  some  countries  remain
relatively stable and others eventually break into social unrest.
Purpose
The purpose of this report is to examine the differences between cultural values and practices in
different countries. Through this analysis, the report will highlight, which cultural dimensions are
relevant  in  causing  the  violation  of  peoples’ cultural  expectations.  We  will  also  examine  the
direction in which these violations happen (e.g. positive or negative gap direction) and examine
whether this direction plays a part in the risk of social unrest.
Research Questions
● Are there cultural dimensions that can be seen to drive the communication of dissatisfaction
and the eventual risk of social unrest in a given society?
● If yes, then:
• which dimensions influence the risk of social unrest, and to which degree?
• does the direction of movement in the gap between values and practice relate to the
communication of dissatisfaction?
Overview of the study
The study will commence with a literature review of three social movements theories and three
interpersonal communication theories. After this, our methodology will define our relevant theory,
in which we explain the two key data sets we are using for this study. These are the GLOBE study
of 62 societies and the EIU Political Instability Index. Moving on from this, we will explain how
these two reports can be immersed into one for the purpose of this study. Our data analysis will
investigate correlations between cultural dimensions in the 5 different risk categories. In the results
we will establish what trends, if any, can be found. This will be further evaluated in our discussion,
before concluding the study. 
Scope of research
It is clear from much of the available literature on social unrest, that many researchers are focusing
on ‘Wellbeing’ and ‘Globalisation’ as factors which impact the risk of social unrest. For socially
focused research,  The International  Labour  Organization  (ILO),  has  used data  from the  Gallup
World Poll. This data uses 5 variables in the construction of their Social Unrest Index. These are:
Confidence in Government, Living Standard, Local Job Market, Freedom in your Life and Access to
Internet. Whilst this is a valuable index which focuses on social conditions, we are attempting to
concentrate solely on cultural values at the micro level  and establish how the communication of
dissatisfaction can eventually lead to social unrest. One limitation of our study is that we are using
the GLOBE cultural taxonomy. This study was conducted among middle management which may
not  be  fully  representative  of  all  people  and  their  values  within  a  given  society.  It  was  also
conducted with the intent to focus on cultural differences between leaders within organisations. On
the other hand, the strength of the GLOBE study is that it provides us with two sets of figures for
each country and each dimension - one set on cultural values and one set on cultural practices.
9These two sets of data are invaluable for our study, since it allows us to calculate the difference
between values and practices and analyse whether this  gap has an impact on the risk of social
unrest. 
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Theoretical Framework
In order to investigate how culture may be a driver  in the communication of dissatisfaction, it is
necessary to develop an approach which allows us to construct a method in which we can assess the
variables of culture and the impact these variables have on the risk of social unrest. This involves
combining two different research studies. However, before we explain the variables of culture and
social unrest, we will provide an explicit statement of our theoretical assumptions. After this we will
provide details of our framework in which we provide an overview of what culture is and how it can
be measured for the purpose of our study. Finally, we will explain social unrest and how it can also
be measured for the purpose of this investigation.  An explanation of how we merge the two data
sets together will be given later in the Methodology.
Assumptions
The fundamental concept of our analysis is the assumption that the gap between what people have
and what people want can lead to disappointment and a violation of expectations. Political scientist
James C. Davies discusses this in his model the 'Davies J-Curve'. This model proposes that when
the gap between expectations and reality remains stable then it is an ‘acceptable gap’, however, if
there is a sudden increase in the gap size, this then becomes an ‘unacceptable gap’. 
Figure 3 - The Davies J-curve (sourced from: globalpost.com)
This idea of an 'unacceptable' gap will be revisited later in our ‘discussion’ where we will further
explore  how  unexpected  violations  lead  to  discontent  which  can  cause  the  communication  of
dissatisfaction among people within a culture.
What is Culture?
To assess the impact of culture on social unrest, it is necessary to establish a clear definition of
culture. According to Lustig & Koester (2010) culture can be described as a learned set of shared
interpretations about:
 beliefs – what people assume to be true about the world; e.g. what is logical and illogical
 values – the characteristics which people desire; e.g what is good and bad
 norms – the expectations of appropriate behaviour
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 social  practices  –  predictable  behaviour  patterns  that  people  within  a  culture  typically
follow.
Beliefs,  values,  norms and social  practices  vary from culture to  culture,  an  example of  this  is
offered by Allwood (1985) who states “[t]hat the members of a group have two legs is thus not a
cultural  characteristic  but  a  natural  one,  while  a  special  but  common  way  of  walking  would
probably be cultural.” 
Cultural Patterns
Understandably, there have been numerous studies to understand how culture impacts how people
act  and  react  in  various  situations.  Once  these  reactions  become more  predictable,  behaviours
become programmed and cultural patterns will develop. As Lustig & Koester (2010, p.84) state,
“[c]ultural patterns are the basis for interpreting the symbols used in communication”. They also
“form the basis for what is considered to communicatively appropriate and effective” (Lustig &
Koester, 2010, p.105).
Taxonomies
Researchers, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, wanted to make sense of cultural patterns by exploring the
“problems or orientations that each culture must address” (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p.90). They
established that these ‘problems’ were addressed by five different value orientations. The patterns
they defined are  orientations  to:  activity;  relationships,  human nature,  people-nature,  and  time.
Whilst these issues looked at similarities across cultures, Geert Hofstede offered another approach
to  understanding cultures  by focusing  on what  makes  each culture  unique  and different  to  the
others. In this study more than 100 000 IBM employees were surveyed. Hofstede believed  that
culture  was  a  form  of  mental  programming  and  that  these  programs  “lie  within  the  social
environments in which one grew up and collected one's life experiences” (Hofstede, Hofstede &
Minkov, 2010, p. 5). Hofstede et al. (2010, p.5) also stressed that even though the “software of the
mind … only indicates what reactions are likely and understandable”, people can deviate from what
is expected and “react in ways that are new, creative, destructive, or unexpected.” This research
identified seven dominant patterns, or dimensions, along which culture can be assessed. These are:
power  distance,  uncertainty  avoidance,  individualism  versus  collectivism,  masculinity  versus
femininity,  long-term  versus  short-term  orientation  to  time,  indulgence  versus  restraint,  and
momentialism  versus  self-effacement (Lustig  &  Koester,  2010,  p.113).  The  study  of  cultural
patterns, also known as cultural taxonomies, assess different cultural dimensions thereby making it
easier to compare one culture to the next.
The GLOBE Study
One such cultural taxonomy is called the GLOBE study, which is the foundation of this thesis.
GLOBE is an acronym for ‘Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness’. The
study builds on the work of Hofstede, and Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, and identifies nine dimensions
along which culture can be ordered. These nine dimensions differentiate between cultural practices
(what people do) and cultural values (what people should do). The dimensions are separated as
follows:
Power Distance is the degree to which people in a culture believe there should be unequal power
distribution, of which, it  should be mostly concentrated at higher levels of organisations and/or
governments. “Within the high power distance cultures of the East, the stable distribution of power
is  expected  to  bring  order  to  society  and  to  allow unambiguous  allocation  of  roles  and  rigid
structure of relationship” (Carl, Gupta & Javidan, 2004, p.559). With this in mind, then high power
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distance societies (Carl et al, 2004, p.536) tend to have:
 “limited upward mobility”
 “civil liberties” which “are weak and public corruption” which is “high”
 “high growth rates of consumption” and a “high need for resource coordination”
Carl et al (2004, p.518) state that “[w]ithin low power distance cultures, the distaste for large power
differentials is often based on the beliefs that power corrupts”. Low power distance countries (Carl
et al, 2004, p.536) tend to have:
 “civil liberties” which “are strong” and “public corruption” which is “low”
 “high upward society mobility”
 “mature growth rates of consumption and high per capita purchasing power”. 
Uncertainty Avoidance is the degree to which people avoid ambiguity by relying on social norms
and bureaucratic practices. In communication, Berger & Bradac (1982) and Berger & Calabrese
(1975) have developed the ‘Uncertainty Reduction Theory’, which attempts to explain “how we
communicate when we are unsure about our surroundings” (Knobloch, 2008, p. 133). In order to
counter  these uncertainties,  societies  which score  higher  in  this  dimension (Sully De Luque &
Javidan, 2004, p.618), tend to:
 “take more moderate calculated risks”
 “show stronger resistance to change”
 “show less tolerance to breaking rules”
Those societies which scored lower in the Uncertainty Avoidance dimension (Sully De Luque &
Javidan, 2004, p.618), tend to:
 “be less calculating when taking risks”
 “show less resistance to change”
 “show less desire to establish rules to dictate behaviour” 
Individualism and Collectivism is the degree to which people in a culture think and act individually,
or collectively as a group. This value is separated into two dimensions, which are: 
 In-Group Collectivism - the degree to which people express loyalty to their families
 Institutional Collectivism - the degree to which a culture encourages collective actions and
sharing of resources
Both  forms  of  collectivism  share  similar  features.  Those  societies  which  score  higher  in
collectivism (Gelfand, Bhawak, Nishii. & Bechtold, 2004, p.454) tend to have:
 “group goals [which] take precedence over individual goals”
 “a slower pace of life”
 “lower subjective well-being”
On the contrary to these features, those societies which score lower in collectivism (Gelfand et al,
2004, p.454), tend to have:
 “individual goals [which] take precedence over group goals”
 “a faster pace of life”
 “higher subjective well-being”
Gender Egalitarianism is the degree to which people in a culture minimize gender role differences.
This dimension encompasses two aspects of societal culture. The first part reflects the extent to
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which society rewards ‘masculine’ values such as competition and success, versus ‘feminine’ values
such as solidarity and nurturance. The second part of the Gender Egalitarianism dimension reflects
what a society believes is appropriate behaviour for males versus females. According to Emrich,
Denmark & Den Hartog (2004, p.359), societies which score higher in this dimension tend to:
 “have more women in positions of authority”
 “accord women a higher status in society”
 “have higher female literacy rates”
Contrary to this, societies that score lower tend to (Emrich et al, 2004, p.359):
 “have fewer women in positions of authority”
 “accord women a lower status in society”
 “have lower female literacy rates”
In addition, “[m]embers of societies that embraced more gender-egalitarianism values expressed a
desire for less government” (Emrich et al, 2004, p.387).
Assertiveness is the degree to which people are confrontational and whether it is encouraged to be
aggressive in  their  social  relationships.  Doney,  Cannon, and Mullen (1998) “confirm a cultural
pattern of assertiveness and aggressiveness that is consistent with a tendency towards opportunism”
(as cited in Den Hartog, 2004, p.404). Societies which score higher in this dimension (Den Hartog,
2004, p.405) tend to:
 “value competition”
 “believe that anyone can succeed if he or she tries hard enough”
 “believe that individuals are in control”
Conversely, societies which score lower in assertiveness (Den Hartog, 2004, p.405) tend to:
 “value cooperation”
 “associate competition with defeat and punishment”
 “think of others as inherently worthy of trust”
Performance Orientation is the degree to which people encourage others in the culture to excel in
their  tasks.  Cultures  which  score  high  in  this  dimension  “tend  to  focus  on  the  future”  and
“achievement”,  while  “low-scoring cultures tend to focus on tradition” and “family” (Mansour,
2004, p.241). The GLOBE study found some key differences between societies which score higher
in practices and those that score higher in values. According to Mansour (2004, p.258), societies
which score higher in Performance Orientation practices:
 “are economically more successful and globally more competitive”
 “enjoy a more positive attitude towards life and live in a more civil society”
 “prefer individual accountability for their own well-being”
Similarly, those that score lower in Performance Orientation (Mansour, 2004, p.259):
 “are less competitive”
 “have lower life expectancy”
 “experience weak economic prosperity”
Future Orientation is the degree to which people engage in future oriented behaviours and delay
gratifications. “[F]uture-orientated individuals and cultures have a capacity to enrich their lives and
maintain self-control, whereas present-oriented individuals and cultures strive to simplify their lives
and rely more on others” (Ashkanasy,  Gupta,  Mayfield, & Trevor-Roberts, 2004, p.285). In the
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GLOBE study Ashkanasy et  al  (2004, p.302) state  that  societies which score higher  on Future
Orientation, generally:
 “achieve economic success”
 “have a propensity to save for the future”
 “have individuals who are psychologically healthy and socially well adjusted”
Societies which score lower in this dimension (Ashkanasy et al, 2004, p.302) tend to:
 “have lower levels of economic success”
 “have a propensity to spend now, rather than to save for the future”
 “have individuals who are psychologically unhealthy and socially maladjusted”
Humane  Orientation  is  the  degree  to  which  people  encourage  others  to  be  fair,  friendly  and
generous. According to Wolf (1966) “societies that lack formal welfare institutions, where resources
are very unevenly distributed and where political power is often unstable, a system of patronage - a
form of benevolence - “based on relationships of family and friends emerges to fulfil some needs of
individuals” (as cited in Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.566). Higher Humane Orientation societies
(Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.570) tend to believe that: 
 “others are important”
 “children of less-developed societies are expected to give material support to their parents”
 “parents should closely control their children”
In societies which score low in this dimension, they tend to believe that (Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004,
p.570):
 “self-interest is important”
 “children of more-developed countries are not expected to give material support to their
parents”
 “family members are independent”.
In order to process responses from participants, the GLOBE study developed response alternatives
on a seven point likert scale, where 1 equals this “behaviour or characteristic  greatly inhibits  a
person from being an outstanding leader”; and 7 equals this “behaviour or characteristic  greatly
contributes to a person being an outstanding leader” (Hanges & Dickson, 2004, p.127). The five
response alternatives in-between grade progressively between the two extremes.  This scale, thus,
gives  researchers  a  quantifiable  method  to  measure  cultural  values  and  practices.  It  provides
“lenses  through which  cultures  can  be understood and appreciated”  (Lustig  & Koester,   2010,
p.140). However, to fully comprehend the context of the results, Lustig & Koester (2010, p.108)
state there are three points which must be remembered about all cultural taxonomies and these are:
1. “there is nothing sacred about these approaches and the internal categories they employ”
2. “[c]ultural patterns are understandable not in isolation but as a unique whole”
3. “members of a culture may vary greatly from the pattern that is typical of that culture”
Even though the GLOBE study focuses primarily on 'Leadership' and 'Organisational Behaviour',
the main purpose of  the GLOBE is to  “increase available  knowledge that  is  relevant  to  cross-
cultural interactions” (House, 2004, p.3). For this reason it is possible to apply the study to the
wider society since “[m]anagers and leaders,  as well  as the people they work with,  are part  of
national societies. If we want to understand their behavior, we have to understand their societies”
(Hofstede et al, 2010, p.25). This implies that the results provided by the GLOBE study would offer
a wider representation of the national culture, which makes it possible to use this data set for our
study.
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What is social unrest?
Social unrest can be difficult to define, as it is a term which must often be taken in context to the
situation it is being applied. As Jovanović et al (2012, p.42) state, “[w]hat appears to be a common
form of political expression in one country is seen as major deviant behavior in another country”.
They also state that “social unrest is not necessarily dysfunctional but its manifestations appear as
unexpected, unplanned, often spontaneous as well as unconstrained or uncontrollable within the
functional system in which they occur” (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.40).
The Center for Systematic Peace uses an ecosystem analogy by Scheffer et (2001), to explain such
unexpected  events.  On  page  1,  it  states  “that  strategies  for  sustainable  management  of  such
ecosystems should  focus  on  [building  and]  maintaining  resilience….Stability  domains  typically
depend on slowly changing variables…These factors may be predicted, monitored, and modified. In
contrast, stochastic events that trigger state shifts are usually difficult to predict or control” (Center
for Systematic Peace, 2011, p.1). 
In such situations, the length and severity of unrest varies. Keidal (2005) states, “[t]he intensity of
social unrest can be measured by the number of demonstrations, riots, armed infringements and
strikes within a year (as cited in Jovanović, Renn & Schröter, 2012, p.39). So whilst there is some
chance that these uprisings “may trigger positive changes in society, it is associated with the risk of
experiencing damage to human lives and property” (Jovanović, Renn & Schröter, 2012, p.11).
The Political Instability Index
In order to measure the risk of social unrest, many institutions have developed their own specific
indexes for state fragility - the degree to which a state is vulnerable to unexpected events. These
include the ‘Global Peace Index’ - by the Institute for Economics and Peace; and the ‘Failed State
Index’ - by the Fund for Peace. For the purpose of this study, we chose the 'Political Instability
Index', which divides given countries into 5 different risk categories. This index was developed by
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and looks at the risk of social unrest and the threat this poses
to 150 national governments. Their research is based on the ‘Political Instability Task Force’ (PITF),
a  model  developed  by  George  Mason  University.  This  model  “distinguishes  countries  that
experienced instability from those that remained stable with a two-year lead time” and had “over
80% accuracy. Intriguingly, the model uses few variables and a simple specification” (Goldstone et
al,  2010,  p.190).  Examining  outbreaks  of  unrest,  the  PITF  “identified  141  separate  instability
episodes” between the years of 1955 and 2003; of which most were “complex episodes involving a
combination of different types of instability that overlapped or followed upon each other in close
sequence” (Goldstone et al., 2010, p.192).
Using the PITF model, the EIU Political Instability Index, analyses 15 different indicators of unrest;
12 of which are underlying vulnerabilities such as state history and corruption, and 3 of which are
representative of economic distress, such as unemployment and growth in incomes. Each indicator
is ranked from 0 to 10, where 0 equals no vulnerability and 10 equals highest vulnerability. The risk
level for each country is thus an amalgamation of these 12 indicator scores.
In 2007, 2010 and 2013, these predictions for the risk of social unrest have been published online -
the latest set re-released in an online article by Laza Kekic named, ‘Ripe for Rebellion? Where
protest if likeliest to break out’. 
Since we are not analysing the EIU report but using it as a frame to place the dimensions for each
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country, we do not believe it necessary to develop any further on the EIU methodology, however
more information may be found in appendices A, B, C & D. 
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Literature Review
In researching the available literature for this study, there appears to be some discussion about the
culture of social unrest. Indeed, Friedman & McAdam (1992) confirm that “social movements are
the  sites  where  new  cultural  resources,  such  as  identities  and  ideologies,  are  most  frequently
formulated” (as cited in  Swindler,  1995, p.30). However,  this  study is  focusing on culture as a
driver of the communication of dissatisfaction, which can eventually escalate into social unrest.
There appears to be little study on uprisings as a result of cultural values. For this reason, this
section will review literature in the social movements theories and how individual values impact
these movements. While there are some differences, in the later stages between social movements
and social unrest, our study is focusing on the micro level; on the individual drivers that create the
communication  of  dissatisfaction  (see  figure  2)  -  which  is  a  similar  process  in  both  social
movements and social unrest. After presenting these social movements theories we will also give an
overview  of  interpersonal  communication  theories,  which  in  line  with  the  social  movements
theories can impact individual perceptions of cultural values. 
Social Movements Theories
According to Flynn (2011, p.27), social movements are “in many instances, created through the use
and  manipulation  of  frames,  resources,  and  information”.  The  interdisciplinary  study of  social
movements include many different areas of research which generally focus on the group motivation
and goals. These theories include the ‘Structural-strain theory’ which refers to the idea that social
structures put pressure on individuals to engage in deviant and criminal behavior” (Flynn, 2011,
p.122).  They  also  include  the  ‘Resource  Mobilization’ theory  which  uses  “the  rational  action
paradigm to explain the procedure of selecting the most appropriate means for reaching pre-defined
goals” (Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy and Zald, 2001; as cited in Jovanović et al, 2012, p.49). This
part  of  the  review,  however,  will  focus  on  social  movements  literature  which  addresses  the
individual and the primary drivers of social unrest at a micro level.
The  Rational  Actor  Theory  looks  at  the  “individual  motivation  and  incentives  for  expressing
dissatisfaction” while providing a “general frame in which individuals balance the pros and cons for
taking stances in society” (Jovanović et al, 2012, p.47). According to the OECD Reviews of Risk
Management  Policies  (Jovanović  et  al,  2012,  p.46),  “[t]he  theory of  rational  action  provides  a
concept of how people make decisions in the face of uncertainty”. However, it does not address the
reasons for why people initially become dissatisfied with their circumstances. As the OECD report
continues, dissatisfaction is often “linked to the gap between personal expectation and perceived
reality” in which “one can assume that the expression of dissatisfaction is a function of experience
of unfair  treatment by others” (Jovanović et  al,  2012, p.46).  Whilst  this  dissatisfaction may be
openly  expressed,  “[i]n  terms  of  the  rational  actor  paradigm individuals  calculate  the  costs  of
involvement  and  protest  against  the  product  of  probability  and  expected  revenues  of  being
successful”  (Jovanović,  Renn  &  Schröter,  2012,  p.57).  As  Jaeger  et  al  (2001)  state  “[s]uch
calculations will  not  be performed in any conscious act of deliberation but more or less as an
internalized process of weighing the pros and cons” (as cited in Jovanović et al, 2012, p.57).
The  Framing  Theory is  adapted  from  Goffman’s  theory  of  frame  alignment  and  adds  a
“constructivist social psychological and ideological dimension to resource mobilization” (Snow et
al, 1986, as cited in Langman & Morris, n.d). While resource mobilization theorists hold “that a
social movement arises from long-term changes in a group’s organization, available resources, and
opportunities for group action (Flynn, 2011, p.112); framing theorists attempt “to understand the
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way in which social movements and social movement actors create and use meaning, or how events
and ideas are framed” (Christiansen, 2011, p.147). Even though this theory is invariably used at the
macro scale for collective action, the theory stems from the work of Erving Goffman (1974) which
focuses on the micro level. Goffman believed that “people frame experiences in order to organize
and understand the world around them. Much like a picture frame excludes things while focusing
attention on others, so does framing” (Christiansen, 2011, p.147). In addition Christiansen (2011,
p.147) adds “[f]raming helps people interpret the world based on their social position and their
previous  experiences.  Every  social  interaction  that  occurs  is  understood  through  a  frame  of
reference within which people react based on their perception of the situation and the way they
perceive the people with whom they are interacting”. 
The Relative Deprivation Theory “refers to the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are
related to a desired point of reference” (Flynn, 2011, p.100). Morris & Herring (1984, p.25) discuss
this  theory  through  the  approach  that  “focuses  on  the  relationship  between  social  conditions,
perceptions of those conditions, and behaviors resulting from those perceptions”. This theory argues
that “when people perceive great discrepancies between the power and privileges they possess and
the amount they ought to possess, they become frustrated, angered, and subsequently participate in
movements and protest to offset feelings of deprivation” (Morris & Herring, 1984, p.26). As Flynn
(2011, p.110) states “[r]elative deprivation is generally considered to be the central variable in the
explanation of social movements and is used to explain the quest for social change that inspires
social movement”.
Communication Theories
It  would  be  very  difficult  to  discuss  cultural  values  and  the  role  these  values  play  in  social
movements at the micro level, without discussing the role of communication. In this part of the
literature review, we will discuss communication theories which are similar to, and support, the
social movements theories we have thus far presented. 
However,  before  presenting  these  theories,  we  will  present  an  understanding  of  the  term
‘communication’.  There  are  numerous  and different  definitions  of  this  term,  yet,  John Stewart
(1999) stressed that “[c]ommunication is the way humans build our reality. Human worlds are not
made up of objects but of peoples’ responses to objects, or their meanings. And these meanings are
negotiated in communication” (as cited in Baxter & Braithwaite, 2008, p.4). Julia Wood (2002,
p.89) builds on this concept by talking about perception as “an active process of creating meaning
by  selecting,  organizing,  and  interpreting  people,  objects,  events,  situations,  and  activities.”
Therefore the following theories will address these notions with a focus on the theories relevant to
this study.
The Social Exchange Theory in communication studies bears similarities with the ‘rational actor’
theory in social movements studies as it has roots in economics and behaviourist psychology. Laura
Stafford (2008, p.378) states that “[s]ocial behaviour is a series of exchanges. Individuals attempt to
maximize their rewards and minimize their costs”. Embedded in this assumption are two concepts
about  self-interest  and  interdependence.  Stafford  (2008,  p.380)  writes  that  “[i]ndividuals  are
motivated to interact with others in ways that serve self-interest”, and, “[i]nterdependence means
that each person’s outcomes or rewards are influenced by the other’s efforts”. Lawyer (2001, p.323)
builds on this notion by stating “interdependencies among actors produce joint activities that, in
turn,  generate  positive  or  negative  emotions;  these  emotions  are  attributed  to  social  units
(relationships, networks, groups) under certain conditions, thereby producing stronger or weaker
individual-to-collective ties”. As a result of these interdependencies, rules of exchange are adopted.
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Gouldner (1960) believes that as a ‘folk belief’, reciprocity “involves the cultural expectation that
people get what they deserve” (as cited in Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005, p.876). Therefore, with
these expectations of exchange as a balance maximising benefits versus costs, it can be anticipated
that these expectations plays a role in the risk of social unrest at a micro level. 
The Attribution Theory within communication studies, draws similarities with the ‘framing theory’
of social movements. Manusov & Spitzberg (2008, p.38) refer to work of Fritz Heider who believed
that “people are active interpreters of the events that occur in their lives, and they use consistent and
logical modes of sense-making in their interpretations. They do so, in large part, to both understand
and control the world around them”. Joy Hart (2005, p.47) adds to this by claiming three basic
assumptions about the attribution theory, which are: “(1) individuals assign causes to behavior they
observe, (2) individuals use systematic processes in explaining behavior, and (3) once attributions
are made, they influence feelings and subsequent behavior”. This theory, therefore, may play a part
in the meaning people assign at the micro level, which can escalate into group involvement and
eventual participation in social unrest. 
The Expectancy Violations Theory (EVT) “seeks to explain and predict how communicators assess
behaviour  that  deviates  from  expectation  and  how  they  respond  communicatively  to  such
violations” (White, 2008, p.189). Similar to the relative deprivation theory, EVT looks at the gap
between expectations and outcomes. Burgoon (1993) noted that “expectancies can refer to what we
anticipate  will  occur  (predictive  expectancies)  or  to  what  is  desired  or  preferred  (prescriptive
expectancies)” (as cited in White, 2008, p.191). The violations of expectations, means that people
must make sense of situations and assign value to the violation. If the violation results in a positive
experience, then it is assigned a positive valence. If it results in a negative experience, then the
violation has a negative valence. Subsequently, this theory may aid in the understanding of cultural
expectations and the result violations play in the risk of social unrest.
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Methodology
With the foundation of the EIU and GLOBE studies established, we will now clarify how we merge
these studies together, in order to analyse how cultural values can lead to the violation of peoples’
expectations,  which in  turn can cause the communication of  dissatisfaction and eventual  social
unrest.
Approach
This is a quantitative study which looks at the influences of cultural expectations on the risk of
social unrest. In order to assess the impact of these variables we need a method to measure the gap
between cultural  practices  and values,  which  we will  use to  assess  the impact  this  has  on the
communication of dissatisfaction. The GLOBE study which builds on the work of ‘Hofstede’ and
‘Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck’ provides such a breakdown with cultural  values and practices being
divided into nine different cultural dimensions. We will cross-reference the gap (between values and
practices) with the EIU's Political Instability Index, which looks at the risk of social unrest in the
given countries. These countries have been split into five different risk categories - very low risk,
low risk, medium risk, high risk and very high risk. 
Modification
To start  with,  we must  establish which  countries  appear  in  both  studies.  Since  the  EIU report
contains over 150 different countries whereas the GLOBE study only contains 62 countries, our
combined  dataset  will  only  use  those  countries  which  appear  in  both  datasets.  This  yields  60
cultures. However, some discrepancies exist in how the countries are presented. This means that we
must therefore adjust the data for the following three countries:
• Germany is represented as east Germany and west Germany in the GLOBE study: The EIU
has published its risk category as one country. Since the two GLOBE figures for Germany
are not  contradictory to  each other,  we find it  reasonable  to  average  the scores  of  east
Germany and west Germany from GLOBE into one combined score in our dataset.
• Like Germany, Switzerland is presented as a French and a German speaking nation in the
GLOBE study, whilst the EIU has it as one country in one risk category. For a modern, well-
integrated nation like Switzerland, we found it reasonable to average the scores of French
speaking Switzerland and German speaking Switzerland from the GLOBE study into one
combined score in our dataset.
• Similarly, South Africa in the GLOBE study is represented in two different data groups, one
Sub-Saharan (black) and one Anglo (white). However, in the EIU report, South Africa is
reported  as  one  country,  in  one  risk  category.  We  found  no  way  of  reconciling  the
differences between the two opposing figure sets and South Africa was therefore excluded
from our study.
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Merging
The merging of the two studies means that the resulting countries we are to analyse result in the
following table. 
Table 1 - The distribution of the 57 GLOBE countries into the five EIU risk categories
Figures
The figures produced in the GLOBE study to which we will be referring is sourced from Lustig &
Koester  (2004).  In their  presentation of the 9 dimensions for each country,  they use ‘0’ as the
midpoint - where a positive score means that the cultural practice or value is high in this dimension
and  a  negative  score  means  that  the  cultural  value  or  practice  is  low in  this  dimension.  The
exception to this is Gender Egalitarianism - where a positive score means that the culture has a
greater inclination towards feminine qualities and a negative score means the culture is inclined
towards masculine qualities (see appendix E). 
The next step in our study is to incorporate the values for each of the nine cultural dimensions into
the risk category framework. We multiply all values in the dataset by 100, in order to rid the data of
decimal points and simplify the presentation. This does not affect the analysis.  For each country
there is a left column and a right column of numbers where:
• The left column contains the cultural practice score (as per GLOBE study)
• The right column contains the cultural values score (as per GLOBE study)
Very low risk Low risk Medium risk High risk Very high risk
Austria Australia England Albania Argentina
Denmark Canada Colombia Brazil Bolivia
Japan Costa Rica Equador China Egypt
Switzerland Finland El Salvador Guatemala Greece
Germany France Iran Nigeria
Hong Kong Georgia Kazakhstan Venezuela
Malaysia Hungary Mexico Zimbabwe
Namibia India Morocco
New Zealand Indonesia Philippines
Poland Ireland Portugal
Singapore Israel Spain
Sweden Italy Turkey
Taiwan Kuwait
USA Netherlands
Qatar
Russia
Slovenia
South Korea
Thailand
Zambia
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Table 2 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU very low risk group
Table 3 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU low risk group
very low  risk Austria Denmark Japan Sw itzerland
Power Distance -93 -86 -302 7 -16 36 -70 -33
Uncertainty Avoidance 166 -159 176 -133 -15 -50 168 -185
In-group Collectivism -41 -112 -220 -48 -71 -115 -169 -56
Institutional Collectivism 12 -2 132 -110 226 -150 -26 38
Gender Egalitarianism -245 175 -19 228 -218 70 -216 170
Assertiveness 129 -153 -30 -66 -154 302 -44 -50
Performance Orientation 132 -95 128 -285 95 61 141 -171
Future Orientation 86 44 30 -104 30 -237 125 8
Humane Orientation -78 -147 73 10 43 -7 -68 45
low  risk Australia Canada Costa Rica Finland Germany Hongkong Malaysia
Power Distance -102 13 -84 -10 -102 -45 -67 -80 51 -35 -51 147 -2 68
Uncertainty Avoidance 38 -107 69 -144 -57 -9 143 -128 171 -163 26 -1 103 40
In-group Collectivism -133 21 -121 81 23 112 -147 -70 -120 -131 23 -156 49 48
Institutional Collectivism 10 -68 32 -114 -76 88 92 -26 -137 2 -28 -62 87 26
Gender Egalitarianism -161 216 -81 235 -118 135 -175 99 -247 189 -143 74 -132 -46
Assertiveness 35 -3 -28 48 -110 33 -28 12 135 -100 143 147 -77 147
Performance Orientation 52 -85 126 36 -54 -73 85 -105 56 -112 39 0 158 95
Future Orientation 65 -20 98 59 5 -17 -73 47 17 29 176 -95 60 26
Humane Orientation 39 68 83 94 62 -192 -28 169 -168 10 -40 -47 163 37
low  risk Namibia New  Zealand Poland Singapore Sw eden Taiw an USA
Power Distance 26 -42 -67 231 -18 112 -44 89 -77 -10 1 10 -70 33
Uncertainty Avoidance 6 80 98 -87 -90 12 191 -68 192 -168 -20 110 -2 -103
In-group Collectivism -86 109 -201 239 50 18 67 -48 -203 101 60 -62 -122 26
Institutional Collectivism -28 -72 135 -108 68 -104 156 -38 233 -160 12 82 -12 -114
Gender Egalitarianism -32 53 -210 49 5 110 -81 108 -43 243 -291 13 -178 224
Assertiveness -66 12 -201 -44 -25 11 5 87 -112 -33 -63 -138 110 74
Performance Orientation -78 151 -82 98 -160 -73 264 2 117 -148 -43 -73 65 -46
Future Orientation -108 134 156 86 -53 50 201 -71 -96 -47 43 -65 89 56
Humane Orientation -28 -12 48 -254 -101 -56 -126 160 2 99 -57 -73 16 46
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Table 4 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study for the countries belonging to the EIU medium risk group
medium risk England Colombia Ecuador El Salvador France Georgia Hungary
Power Distance -5 19 90 -202 26 -127 118 -16 118 7 10 30 90 -71
Uncertainty Avoidance 81 -86 -98 56 -80 85 -90 111 44 2 -110 98 -173 4
In-group Collectivism -145 -35 79 159 90 37 27 233 -67 57 142 -4 14 -37
Institutional Collectivism 5 -86 -105 128 -84 134 -129 182 -12 106 -52 -182 -172 -78
Gender Egalitarianism -89 247 -89 211 -250 125 226 139 -97 150 121 -57 22 133
Assertiveness 0 -19 13 -60 -17 -27 129 -32 79 -68 8 78 175 -72
Performance Orientation 93 -107 -126 44 -24 29 -11 117 -24 -36 -95 12 -139 49
Future Orientation -5 -17 -40 140 25 -1 -96 189 83 44 -55 -80 -169 2
Humane Orientation -78 2 -78 81 117 -23 -80 15 -145 213 18 76 -155 24
medium risk India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Kuw ait Netherlands
Power Distance 69 -28 1 -103 -5 -7 -105 -5 59 -77 -13 126 -250 -83
Uncertainty Avoidance -2 15 -40 97 23 -100 -25 -42 -62 -27 8 22 89 -227
In-group Collectivism 105 -98 72 -1 -1 18 -61 21 -28 12 89 -68 -197 -139
Institutional Collectivism 32 -6 5 88 92 -30 51 -94 -136 78 58 82 51 -38
Gender Egalitarianism -296 108 -199 -23 -213 241 -218 150 -204 186 -382 -116 -135 209
Assertiveness -116 140 -80 134 -63 24 22 -10 -22 -1 -143 -10 46 -122
Performance Orientation 74 24 2 49 28 -68 0 -61 -130 100 -128 58 165 -105
Future Orientation 38 29 10 -68 65 8 -5 -62 -131 35 -38 23 55 -140
Humane Orientation 100 -65 125 -117 181 19 2 85 -97 68 89 -161 -49 -100
medium risk Qatar Russia Slovenia South Korea Thailand Zambia
Power Distance -30 144 80 -34 36 -48 101 -54 106 36 31 -89
Uncertainty Avoidance 16 30 -213 71 -64 58 -102 6 -39 158 -10 6
In-group Collectivism -11 -21 65 32 38 10 53 -73 75 23 94 26
Institutional Collectivism 128 78 60 -170 -28 -72 228 168 -52 72 87 0
Gender Egalitarianism -38 -31 19 38 -11 175 -404 46 -175 34 -307 66
Assertiveness 66 -4 -129 -150 -41 114 68 112 -140 -53 -22 83
Performance Orientation 50 102 -210 -5 -56 -19 26 46 91 170 -50 97
Future Orientation -86 2 -179 -125 -111 137 113 -212 -43 -65 15 86
Humane Orientation 146 -56 -32 72 -63 -78 -59 76 150 183 238 46
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Table 5 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study, of the countries belonging to the EIU high risk group
Table 6 - Showing the raw data from the GLOBE study, of the countries belonging to the EIU very high risk group
very high risk Argentina Bolivia Egypt Greece Nigeria Venezuela Zimbabwe
Power Distance 108 -118 -156 196 -60 147 52 -101 146 -13 52 -130 115 -19
Uncertainty Avoidance -85 4 -135 10 -17 118 -128 74 21 157 -120 102 -2 15
In-group Collectivism 49 131 44 90 67 -32 16 -59 55 -54 52 137 57 48
Institutional Collectivism -141 116 -50 72 60 22 -240 132 -26 58 -69 130 -31 26
Gender Egalitarianism -137 207 -121 158 -320 -73 -140 188 -66 51 -102 173 -258 97
Assertiveness 19 -87 -99 -15 -66 -83 118 -131 104 -90 49 -75 -25 116
Performance Orientation -167 68 -52 32 2 73 -97 -75 52 131 -108 71 -17 139
Future Orientation -113 119 -123 29 43 -17 -227 -44 -45 95 -196 119 35 149
Humane Orientation -21 68 -9 -157 133 -113 -157 -87 2 125 33 -51 75 -104
high risk Albania Brazil China Guatemala Iran Kazakhstan
Power Distance -131 228 136 -112 -32 106 99 -112 59 19 31 120
Uncertainty Avoidance 68 119 -93 58 129 105 -43 40 -82 118 -84 -35
In-group Collectivism 80 -126 4 -145 89 -162 65 128 120 51 15 -65
Institutional Collectivism 70 -60 -100 176 125 -36 -132 98 -88 160 10 -140
Gender Egalitarianism -78 40 -186 209 -256 -68 -264 112 -272 -53 -43 158
Assertiveness 203 87 13 -138 -107 242 -72 -29 -30 175 85 2
Performance Orientation 2 -19 -9 46 -22 -187 -132 100 -32 83 -61 -109
Future Orientation 179 -98 -15 53 88 -86 -73 56 121 38 -133 -64
Humane Orientation 114 -38 -91 112 56 -47 -42 -73 29 1 -21 85
high risk Mexico Morocco Philippines Portugal Spain Turkey
Power Distance 10 33 225 109 61 -5 61 -103 80 -138 92 -95
Uncertainty Avoidance 3 102 -35 184 -45 82 -42 -33 -32 20 -88 6
In-group Collectivism 76 76 166 98 165 139 49 -73 41 32 99 26
Institutional Collectivism -45 36 -16 120 29 8 -79 112 -96 92 -52 104
Gender Egalitarianism -97 154 -248 15 -97 123 -91 239 -266 173 -299 106
Assertiveness 82 -6 101 -22 -39 197 -137 -38 74 22 104 -176
Performance Orientation 4 88 -128 202 65 105 -30 -117 -74 32 -24 80
Future Orientation 0 62 53 50 28 107 -126 134 -23 -47 -68 -170
Humane Orientation -24 144 89 37 215 -29 -38 -51 -162 116 -32 41
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Calculations
After calculating the difference between the cultural values and practices for each dimension, we
are left with just one score which equals the gap between reality and expectations. In the following
tables, these results are colour coded for a quicker overview of the general trends. Therefore the
colours for the gap differences are as follows:
• yellow equals the gap score is no more than a 100 points difference (in either direction)
between values and practices
• red equals a negative gap score – when the people want/value the dimension less than their
current practice
• green equals a positive gap score – when the people want/value the dimension more than
their current practice
In addition, on the right hand side of each table there are two white scores. The left of these equals
the mean score for that specific dimension in  the table.  The right  score contains  the computed
standard deviation of the DCD index for all the countries in the table which is a measure of the
spread of  the  values  from the  average.  The results  in  each dimension for  each country are  as
follows: 
Table 7 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the very low risk group. Calculated
from the data in Table 2
Table 8 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the low risk group. Calculated from the
data in Table 3.
low  risk Australia Canada Costa Rica Finland Germany Hongkong Malaysia
Power Distance 115 74 57 -13 -86 198 70 78 101
Uncertainty Avoidance -145 -213 48 -271 -334 -27 -63 -115 164
In-group Collectivism 154 202 89 77 -11 -179 -1 82 173
Institutional Collectivism -78 -146 164 -118 139 -34 -61 -87 148
Gender Egalitarianism 377 316 253 274 436 217 86 256 112
Assertiveness -38 76 143 40 -235 4 224 38 113
Performance Orientation -137 -90 -19 -190 -168 -39 -63 -63 148
Future Orientation -85 -39 -22 120 12 -271 -34 -29 139
Humane Orientation 29 11 -254 197 178 -7 -126 13 161
low  risk Namibia New  Zealand Poland Singapore Sw eden Taiw an USA
Power Distance -68 298 130 133 67 9 103
Uncertainty Avoidance 74 -185 102 -259 -360 130 -101
In-group Collectivism 195 440 -32 -115 304 -122 148
Institutional Collectivism -44 -243 -172 -194 -393 70 -102
Gender Egalitarianism 85 259 105 189 286 304 402
Assertiveness 78 157 36 82 79 -75 -36
Performance Orientation 229 180 87 -262 -265 -30 -111
Future Orientation 242 -70 103 -272 49 -108 -33
Humane Orientation 16 -302 45 286 97 -16 30
very low  risk Austria Denmark Japan Sw itzerland
Power Distance 7 309 52 37 101 140
Uncertainty Avoidance -325 -309 -35 -353 -256 148
In-group Collectivism -71 172 -44 113 43 118
Institutional Collectivism -14 -242 -376 64 -142 203
Gender Egalitarianism 420 247 288 386 335 81
Assertiveness -282 -36 456 -6 33 308
Performance Orientation -227 -413 -34 -312 -247 161
Future Orientation -42 -134 -267 -117 -140 94
Humane Orientation -69 -63 -50 113 -17 87
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Table 9 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for medium group. Calculated from the
data in Table 4.
medium risk England Colombia Ecuador El Salvador France Georgia Hungary
Power Distance 24 -292 -153 -134 -111 20 -161 -55 124
Uncertainty Avoidance -167 154 165 201 -42 208 177 59 146
In-group Collectivism 110 80 -53 206 124 -146 -51 -14 105
Institutional Collectivism -91 233 218 311 118 -130 94 17 149
Gender Egalitarianism 336 300 375 -87 247 -178 111 238 181
Assertiveness -19 -73 -10 -161 -147 70 -247 11 132
Performance Orientation -200 170 53 128 -12 107 188 48 134
Future Orientation -12 180 -26 285 -39 -25 171 24 145
Humane Orientation 80 159 -140 95 358 58 179 2 169
medium risk India Indonesia Ireland Israel Italy Kuw ait Netherlands
Power Distance -97 -104 -2 100 -136 139 167
Uncertainty Avoidance 17 137 -123 -17 35 14 -316
In-group Collectivism -203 -73 19 82 40 -157 58
Institutional Collectivism -38 83 -122 -145 214 24 -89
Gender Egalitarianism 404 176 454 368 390 266 344
Assertiveness 256 214 87 -32 21 133 -168
Performance Orientation -50 47 -96 -61 230 186 -270
Future Orientation -9 -78 -57 -57 166 61 -195
Humane Orientation -165 -242 -162 83 165 -250 -51
medium risk Qatar Russia Slovenia South Korea Thailand Zambia
Power Distance 174 -114 -84 -155 -70 -120
Uncertainty Avoidance 14 284 122 108 197 16
In-group Collectivism -10 -33 -28 -126 -52 -68
Institutional Collectivism -50 -230 -44 -60 124 -87
Gender Egalitarianism 7 19 186 450 209 373
Assertiveness -70 -21 155 44 87 105
Performance Orientation 52 205 37 20 79 147
Future Orientation 88 54 248 -325 -22 71
Humane Orientation -202 104 -15 135 33 -192
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Table 10 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for the high risk group . Calculated from
the data in Table 5.
Table 11 - Shows the gap scores, as well as the mean and standard deviations for very high risk group. Calculated from
the data in Table 6
very high risk Argentina Bolivia Egypt Greece Nigeria Venezuela Zimbabwe
Power Distance -226 352 207 -153 -159 -182 -134 -42 226
Uncertainty Avoidance 89 145 135 202 136 222 17 135 69
In-group Collectivism 82 46 -99 -75 -109 85 -9 -11 84
Institutional Collectivism 257 122 -38 372 84 199 57 150 137
Gender Egalitarianism 344 279 247 328 117 275 355 278 81
Assertiveness -106 84 -17 -249 -194 -124 141 -66 143
Performance Orientation 235 84 71 22 79 179 156 118 74
Future Orientation 232 152 -60 183 140 315 114 154 116
Humane Orientation 89 -148 -246 70 123 -84 -179 -54 147
high risk Albania Brazil China Guatemala Iran Kazakhstan
Power Distance 359 -248 138 -211 -40 89 -53 180
Uncertainty Avoidance 51 151 -24 83 200 49 93 73
In-group Collectivism -206 -149 -251 63 -69 -80 -83 89
Institutional Collectivism -130 276 -161 230 248 -150 87 161
Gender Egalitarianism 118 395 188 376 219 201 284 102
Assertiveness -116 -151 349 43 205 -83 3 185
Performance Orientation -21 55 -165 232 115 -48 62 135
Future Orientation -277 68 -174 129 -83 69 0 144
Humane Orientation -152 203 -103 -31 -28 106 17 153
high risk Mexico Morocco Philippines Portugal Spain Turkey
Power Distance 23 -116 -66 -164 -218 -187
Uncertainty Avoidance 99 219 127 9 52 94
In-group Collectivism 0 -68 -26 -122 -9 -73
Institutional Collectivism 81 136 -21 191 188 156
Gender Egalitarianism 251 263 220 330 439 405
Assertiveness -88 -123 236 99 -52 -280
Performance Orientation 84 330 40 -87 106 104
Future Orientation 62 -3 79 260 -24 -102
Humane Orientation 168 -52 -244 -13 278 73
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Data Analysis
With  these  combined  datasets  (from  the  EIU  risk  analysis  and  GLOBE  study),  we  test  our
hypothesis on whether the gap between cultural values and practices for a given dimension has a
bearing on the eventual risk of social unrest. In order to do this, we define our study parameter
within each dimension as the Degree of Cultural Dissatisfaction, or DCD, in relation to the risk of
social unrest. DCD is defined below as:
DCD = the gap between Ideal value score of  'X' and Actual practice score of 'X'
Our central study parameter in the combined dataset, where 'X' denotes any one out of the nine possible cultural
dimensions listed in the GLOBE study.
 A positive DCD score represents a desire among people within a culture to have more of that
dimension than is current practice.
 A negative DCD score represents a desire among people within a culture to have less of that
dimension than is current practice. 
After obtaining the DCD scores for all nine cultural dimensions, in all the countries in our study, we
then look for patterns between each of the dimensions and their respective risk category. Searching
for patterns, we then evaluate whether they are relevant as contributors to the risk of social unrest.
The cultural dimensions which show relevant patterns will be further analysed in the discussion. 
DCD values and the cultural dimensions graphs
In order to analyse the DCD scores, we will present the results in nine graphs representing each of
the nine dimensions. Each graph shows the individual countries DCD scores for all five risk groups.
In these graphs, each country has their own individual data point and each EIU risk group has been
assigned its own specific icon. Positive scores indicate a positive DCD score - in which people want
more than they currently have and a negative score indicates a negative DCD score – in which
people want less than they currently have. In order to make the information more explicit, all the
graphs will have the same format. Before each graph, we will provide a short explanation of the
dimension we are analysing before clarifying what, if any trends, were found between the DCD
scores and the risk of social unrest. 
Power  Distance  refers  to  “the  degree  to  which  people  believe  that  power  should  be stratified,
unequally shared,  and concentrated  at  higher  levels  of  organization  or  government”  (Lustig  &
Koester,  2010,  p.  125).  Among  high  power  distance  cultures,  such  as  France  and  Argentina,
disparity between social classes is considered very important. When authorities in higher levels of
society make decisions  or  orders,  those  decisions  and orders  should  be  accepted  and followed
without resistance by those who belong to lower hierarchy. On the contrary, in low power-distance
cultures  such  as  Australia  and  Denmark,  people  value  human  equality  and  believe  that  the
difference  between social  classes  should  be eliminated.  People  also  believe  that  observing and
questioning decisions of authorities is an individual's duty and responsibility. (Lustig & Koester,
2010).
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Graph 1 - Showing the Power Distance DCD scores for all countries in Tables 7 through to 11
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Power Distance.
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 1 3 0 None 101
Low Risk 6 8 0 Some Positive 78
Medium Risk 3 7 10 Mixed, Mostly Negative -55
High Risk 2 4 6 Mixed, Mostly Negative -53
Very High Risk 2 0 5 Mixed, Mostly Negative -42
Data interpretation: The majority of countries in the EIU 'very low risk' and 'low risk' groups show
positive DCD scores indicating that people desire an increase in this dimension in comparison to its
current practice. The countries in the EIU 'medium risk', 'high risk' and 'very high risk' groups show
mostly  negative  DCD  scores,  indicating  that  people  desire  a  decrease  in  this  dimension  in
comparison to its current practice. However, there exists little difference between the countries in
the EIU 'medium risk', 'high risk' and 'very high risk' groups. The appearance of a trend going from
the 'very low risk' group to the 'medium risk' group is contradicted by the widening spread and
rising  average  of  the  'high  risk'  and  'very  high  risk'  groups.  Even  though  a  trend  could  be
constructed moving from the 'very low risk'  DCD scores to 'very high risk' DCD scores, the outliers
in the two higher risk groups detract from a solid pattern in this trend. This makes a correlation
between this dimension and the risk of social unrest weak.
 Evaluation of data: Power Distance shows questionable a DCD pattern which will be further
explained in the 'discussion'.
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Uncertainty Avoidance refers to "the extent to which people strive to avoid uncertainty by relying
on social norms, rules, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future
events" ( Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In high uncertainty avoidance cultures, such as Sweden
and Switzerland, people expect stability in societal goals. Deviation in their social practices is not
preferable  and  can  be  interpreted  as  insecurity.  Consequently,  society  encourages  uncertainty
avoidance through the form of formal and informal regulations. These formalities regulate how an
individual is supposed to behave in order to decrease uncertainty in society. On the other hand, in
low uncertainty avoidance cultures such as Russia and South Korea, people have higher resistance
to uncertainty and are more adaptable to uncertain ways of life. Therefore, people perceive deviance
and ambiguity as outstanding rather than as threatening. Social rules and regulations are mild and
limited among low uncertainty avoidance culture. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 2 - Showing the Uncertainty Avoidance DCD scores for all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Uncertainty Avoidance.
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 0 1 3 All Negative -256
Low Risk 2 4 8 Mixed, Mostly Negative -115
Medium Risk 10 7 3 Mixed, Mostly Positive 59
High Risk 4 8 0 Mixed, Some Positive 93
Very High Risk 5 2 0 Mostly Positive 135
Data  interpretation:  All  five  EIU  social  unrest  risk  groups  show  an  increasing  average  and  a
relatively clustered spread of scores, especially in the 'high risk' and 'very high risk' of social unrest
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groups. There is a clear pattern between these DCD scores and the risk of social unrest. The pattern
starts with large negative DCD scores in the EIU 'very low risk' group and increase to positive DCD
scores in the EIU 'very high risk' group. This indicates that as we move from lower to higher risk
countries,  people desire  this  dimension more and therefore,  a  clear  positive trend between this
dimension and the risk of social unrest can be indicated from these scores.
 Evaluation of data: Uncertainty Avoidance shows a relevant trend of increasing DCD scores
from the EIU 'very low risk' group to  the EIU 'very high risk' group.
In-group Collectivism refers to "the degree to which people express pride, loyalty, and cohesiveness
in their family" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). People in cultures with high in-group collectivism
such as Georgia and the Philippines are tightly committed to their family and social groups. In
contrast to this, people in cultures with low in-group collectivism such as New Zealand and Finland,
find that group membership is not necessarily strong, even within the family unit. People depend
more on themselves and prefer more privacy and freedom. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 3 - Showing the In-group Collectivism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for In-Group Collectivism.
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 2 2 0 Mixed 43
Low Risk 6 5 3 Mixed 82
Medium Risk 3 13 3 Mixed, Mostly no Trend -14
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High Risk 0 8 4 Mixed, Some Negative -83
Very High Risk 0 6 1 Mostly no Trend -11
Data interpretation:  All five EIU risk of social unrest groups show mixed positive and negative
DCD scores. It is difficult to see how any trend can found amongst these varying scores, as the
average in each EIU group doesn't move far from zero.
 Evaluation of data: In-group Collectivism shows a non-relevant DCD pattern.
Institutional Collectivism refers to "the degree to which a culture's institutional practices encourage
collective actions and the collective distribution of resources" ( Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125). In
cultures  such  as  Qatar  and  Japan,  which  have  high  institutional  collectivism,  people  prioritize
benefits of the group before benefits for themselves as individuals. In contrast,  low institutional
collectivism cultures  such as  Italy and Greece,  usually  prioritize  the  individual  benefits  before
benefits of the group. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 4 - Showing the Institutional Collectivism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Institutional Collectivism.
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 0 2 2 Mixed, some Negative -142
Low Risk 6 5 7 Mixed -87
Medium Risk 6 10 4 Mixed 17
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High Risk 7 2 3 Mixed, mostly Positive 87
Very High Risk 4 3 0 Mostly Positive 150
Data interpretation: The five EIU risk of social unrest groups show an increasing average of DCD
scores - starting with negative scores in the low risk groups, moving to positive scores in the high
risk groups. The spread of scores remain similar in all the groups, and it is easy to spot a steadily
increasing trend. This indicates a desire among people in the higher risk groups to have more of this
dimension, whereas the people in the lower risk groups want less of this dimension.
 Evaluation of data: Institutional Collectivism shows a relevant trend in the risk of social
unrest with increasing DCD scores moving from the EIU 'very low risk' group to the EIU
'very high risk' group.
Gender Egalitarianism refers to "the extent to which people minimize gender role difference and
gender discrimination while promoting gender equality" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p 125). In high
gender  egalitarianism cultures such as Hungary and Poland,  people value equality between the
genders and believe that people should be equally treated regardless of their gender. Conversely,
people in low gender egalitarianism cultures such as Austria and Egypt, view the divergence in
gender roles, expectations and treatment, as natural and appropriate. (Lustig & Koester, 2010). 
Graph 5 - Showing the Gender Egalitarianism DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11 
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Gender Egalitarianism.
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Individual country DCD values for Gender Egalitarianism, per EIU risk group
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High
34
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 4 0 0 All positive 335
Low Risk 12 2 0 Mostly positive 256
Medium Risk 16 1 1 Mostly positive 238
High Risk 12 0 0 All positive 284
Very High Risk 7 0 0 All positive 278
Data interpretation: All five EIU risk of social unrest groups show consistently large positive DCD
scores.  This  consistency disqualifies  gender  egalitarianism as  an  indicator  of  the risk of  social
unrest. No trend can be fitted to these scores.
 Evaluation of data: Gender Egalitarianism shows a non-relevant DCD pattern in conjunction
with the risk of social unrest.
Assertiveness refers to "the degree to which people are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in
social  relationships"  (Lustig  &  Koester,  2010,  p.  125).  Among  cultures  which  are  high  on
assertiveness such as Germany and Hong Kong, people are competitive and value success. People
generally believe it is appropriate that rewards and benefits  should be passed to those with the
highest competence. On the other hand, people in low assertiveness cultures such as Kuwait and
Thailand value modesty and peaceful relationships between each other. These cultures view a win-
lose orientation as the creation of disassociation within society. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 6 - Showing the Assertiveness DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
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category, plus the average DCD scores for Assertiveness.
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 1 2 1 Mixed 33
Low Risk 3 10 1 Mixed, mostly no trend 38
Medium Risk 5 11 4 Mixed, mostly no trend 11
High Risk 3 5 4 Mixed 3
Very High Risk 1 2 4 Mixed, mostly Negative -66
Data interpretation: There are mixed positive DCD scores and negative DCD scores across the five
EIU social unrest risk groups. The average of the DCD scores within all the groups revolve around
zero. There are also several large positive DCD scores and several large negative DCD scores but
they average each other out in their respective risk cateogry. No trend can be fitted to these scores.
 Evaluation of data: Assertiveness does not show a DCD pattern which indicates the risk of
social unrest.
Performance Orientation refers to "the extent to which people encourage others to improve their
task-oriented  performance  and  excel"  (Lustig  &  Koester,  2010,  p.  125).  In  high  performance
orientation cultures such as those in Canada and Singapore, competence and performance are very
important  for  an  individual's  accomplishment  -  which  also  determines  one's  social  status.
Conversely,  in  low  performance  orientation  cultures,  such  as  Guatemala,  social  status  of  an
individual  does  not  necessarily  depend  on  knowledge  or  ability  but  rather  depends  on  social
connections,  power and tradition.  Another  aspect  that  shows differences between high and low
performance  orientation  cultures,  is  communicational  context.  In  high  performance  orientation
cultures,  people  use low context  communication and are direct  to  make sure there  is  effective
communication.  In  contrast,  people  with  low  performance  orientation,  use  high  context
communication in order to maintain harmony in their relationships. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
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Graph 7 - Showing the Performance Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Performance Orientation. 
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 0 1 3 Mostly Negative -247
Low Risk 2 6 6 Mixed, mostly Negative -63
Medium Risk 8 10 2 Mixed 48
High Risk 5 6 1 Mixed 62
Very High Risk 3 4 0 All positive 118
Data interpretation:  The five EIU risk of  social  unrest  groups show a gradual  change from all
negative DCD scores in the EIU 'very low risk' group to all positive DCD scores in the EIU 'very
high risk' group. An increasing trend can be found within these scores indicating a desire for more
of this dimension amongst cultures in high risk groups as opposed to cultures in low risk groups
who want less of this dimension.
 Evaluation  of  data:  Performance Orientation  shows a  relevant  trend of  increasing  DCD
scores from the EIU 'very low risk' group to the EIU 'very high risk' group.
Future Orientation refers to "the degree to which people engage in future-oriented behaviours such
as planning, investigating in the future, and delaying gratification" (Lustig & Koester, 2010, p. 125).
In high future orientation cultures such as Hong Kong and Iran, people prefer to make plans and
maintain control for their future security rather than having instantaneous pleasure. In low future
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orientation cultures such as Portugal and Venezuela, people value having present satisfaction rather
than concerning themselves about their past or future (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 8 - Showing the Future Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Future Orientation. 
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 0 1 3 Mostly Negative -140
Low Risk 3 8 3 Mixed -29
Medium Risk 5 13 2 Mixed 24
High Risk 2 7 3 Mixed 0
Very High Risk 6 1 0 Mostly Positive 154
Data interpretation: Although the DCD scores in the 'medium risk' group and 'high risk' groups do
not exhibit any clear change between values and practices; when looking at the whole picture there
exists an identifiable trend going from the 'very low risk' group to the 'very high risk' group. Given
this spread of scores within all the groups, it is possible to observe a pattern between this dimension
and the risk of social unrest.
 Evaluation of data:  Future Orientation shows a relevant trend of increasing DCD scores
from the EIU 'very low risk group' to the EIU very high risk group'.
Humane Orientation refers to "the degree to which people encourage others to be fair, altruistic,
friendly,  generous,  caring  and  kind"  (Lustig  &  Koester,  2010,  p.  125).  Among  high  humane
orientation cultures such as Zambia and Indonesia, people value and encourage actions of kindness
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
Individual country DCD values for Future Orientation, per EIU risk group
Very Low
Low
Medium
High
Very High
38
and sympathy between people. For low humane orientation cultures such as Spain, people prefer
having personal  convenience  and  satisfaction,  or  even  solving  their  personal  problems  without
others sympathy and help. (Lustig & Koester, 2010).
Graph 9 - Showing the Humane Orientation DCD scores of all countries found in Tables 7 through 11.
The table below summarises the overall trends found in tables 7 – 11 for each culture in each risk
category, plus the average DCD scores for Humane Orientation. 
Risk Category Positive
DCD
No
trend
Negative
DCD
Overall DCD trend Average DCD Score
Very Low Risk 1 3 0 Mixed -17
Low Risk 3 8 3 Mixed, mostly no trend 13
Medium Risk 6 7 7 Mixed 2
High Risk 4 5 3 Mixed 17
Very High Risk 1 3 3 Mixed -54
Data interpretation: There exists mixed positive DCD scores and mixed negative DCD scores across
the five EIU risk of social unrest groups. The average DCD scores in each risk category revolves
fairly tightly around zero indicating that many cultures do not desire a change from their current
practice. In addition, there are several large positive DCD scores and several large negative DCD
scores but they appear to average each other out in their risk categories. No clear trend can be found
among these scores.
 Evaluation of data: Humane Orientation shows a non-relevant DCD pattern.
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Results
We  set  out  to  explore  the  relationship  between  cultural  values  and  the  communication  of
dissatisfaction among people within a given culture. We wanted to investigate the nature of those
relationships,  which  we  achieved  by  placing  the  GLOBE  dimensions  into  the  EIU  political
instability  index.  For  each  country  we  calculated  nine  DCD  scores  which  indicated  potential
correlations between the dimensions and the country's risk of social unrest. We found the following
trends:
• For four dimensions, we found that there is a clear correlation between our DCD score and
the assessed risk of social  unrest.  These four were:  Uncertainty  Avoidance,  Institutional
Collectivism, Performance Orientation and Future Orientation. Among these four, the same
pattern could be identified - countries in low risk groups were striving towards a lesser score
of the dimensions, whereas countries in high risk groups were striving towards a higher
score. In the diagrams, this is seen as a positive, rising trend going from left to right. Refer
to Figure 3 for an illustration of this.
• For another  four  dimensions,  we found no correlation between our  DCD score and the
assessed risk of social unrest. These four are: In-group Collectivism, Gender Egalitarianism,
Assertiveness and Humane Orientation. No discernible pattern could be identified with these
dimensions, and so they were ruled out as possible candidates for influencing social unrest.
• For  the  remaining  dimension,  Power  Distance,  the  results  were  inconclusive.  A pattern
could be seen in the graph, but it is not as clear as the other dimensions. The pattern is the
inverse of the other four - countries in low risk groups were striving towards a higher score,
and vice versa. In graph 1 this could be seen as a negative, falling trend going from left to
right.  However,  as  stated,  due  to  the  many outliers,  this  dimension was deemed as  not
showing a clear pattern between the DCD index and the risk of social unrest and so it was
excluded. 
 
Figure 4 - Illustrative rising DCD trend lines inserted into the four identified dimensions. Same data content as Graphs
2, 4, 7 & 8
In summary,  for four out of the nine dimensions,  there were clear indications of a relationship
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between the magnitude of the DCD index and the assessed risk of social unrest in a given country.
These dimensions will be further evaluated in the discussion. 
41
Discussion
The purpose of this research was to investigate the role cultural expectations play in the risk of
social unrest. This was done by using figures from the GLOBE report where we calculated the
difference (gap) between cultural values and practices. If the gap score was positive, this meant that
people valued that dimension more than the current practice. If the gap score was negative, this
meant  that  people  valued  the  dimension  less  than  the  current  practice.  After  calculating  these
figures, we placed all 9 DCD (degree of cultural dissatisfaction) scores into the EIU risk of social
unrest frame for each country. This meant we could analyse the DCD scores according to the risk
category and analyse what trends could be found. 
In this section we will deepen the discussion about our findings. We will begin with a discussion
about the dimensions which displayed a DCD trend between the gap in expectations and the risk
category. 
Performance Orientation reflects the extent to which a community encourages each other to excel
in their daily tasks. Our analysis of this dimension revealed a pattern in which very low and low risk
countries mostly expressed a desire for less of this dimension in their day-to-day lives. Medium,
high and very high risk countries mostly expressed a desire for more of this dimension than they
currently have as a daily practice. According to Javidan (2004, p.245), what this equates to is that
low risk countries (since they want less of that dimension) value:
 less feedback and appraisal as it is seen as being judgemental and discomforting
 more sympathy and tradition.
Conversely, high risk countries value:
 assertiveness, competitiveness and materialism
 education and learning
With these values explicitly defined, it goes without doubt that performance orientation could play
a part in the expression of dissatisfaction. When discussing this dimension and political ideology,
Javidan (2004, p.257) states that “those societies with higher Performance Orientation practices
tend  to  show  a  more  positive  view  toward  democracy  and  prefer  a  less  active  role  for  the
government”.  In  addition,  these  societies  “prefer  a  stronger  role  for  the  private  ownership  of
business and a greater reliance on individual rather than government responsibility” (Javidan, 2004,
p.257). It would then be possible to deduce that countries which are in high risk of social unrest
categories,  have  cultural  values  which  desire  increased  autonomy  from  the  government  and
economic success for the individual. However, as Javidan (2004, p.277) adds about societies which
value this dimension, they “do not necessarily enjoy a greater economic prosperity,  or a public
attitude or government sector that encourages more competitiveness”. This statement about the gap
between value and practices and the result in dissatisfaction which may be incurred, is conducive
with the findings of our study. 
Future Orientation looks at the degree to which people engage in planning and investing for the
future rather than indulging in the present. Our data analysis highlighted that countries in high risk
categories valued this dimension more than the current practice which is the norm. Ashkanasy et al
(2004, p.302) explain that countries which want more of this dimension (eg. high risk countries)
typically value:
 flexibility and adaptability
 delaying instant gratification by placing a higher priority on future plans
Countries  in  low risk  categories  valued this  dimension less  than  their  current  practice  in  their
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culture. In these countries, they tend to value:
 individuals who are inherently less motivated
 instant gratification and rewards
The countries in the middle risk categories showed mixed results. With these results it would be
possible to state that Future Orientation cultural values impact low risk countries generally in a way
which encourages  spontaneity whereas  high  risk  countries  are  impacted  by values  focusing  on
security  in  the  future.  Interestingly,  Jaeger  &  Kanungo  (1990)  believe  that  “predictable
environments  in  industrialized  markets  support  planning”  which  means  that  “[p]eople  in  these
environments give less regard to social and organizational traditions and make decisions based on
the merits for the future” (as cited in Ashkanasy et al, 2004, p.295). Taking heed to this statement,
then it could be possible to draw a conclusion which confirms that low risk countries have security
in their institutions, which allows people to act more freely and indulge in instant gratifications.
Conversely, this dimension may also indicate that the opposite is true. In high risk countries, it is
possible there is little trust in institutions and because of the lack of provisions in social welfare,
people value security.  This  desire  to guarantee future well-being,  may well  be reflected in  our
results on what cultural values can contribute to the risk of social unrest. In addition, Ashkanasy et
al  (2004,  p.318)  state,  “societies  with  stronger  future-orientated  practices  are  less  likely to  be
passive and to reject democracy,  and are more likely to express their  voice”.  According to our
results, this need to express individuals opinions appears to be desired more in high risk countries
than  low  risk  countries.  Therefore,  Future  Orientation is  justifiably  a  dimension  which  can
contribute to the communication of dissatisfaction.
Institutional Collectivism relates to the degree in which a society's practices encourages collective
actions. The data analysis results showed that most low and very low risk countries expressed a
value for less of this dimension whereas most middle, high and very high risk countries expressed a
desire for an increase in this dimension from their current daily practice. Therefore according to
Gelfand et al (2004, p.454), middle and high risk countries desire more collectivist actions and
believe that: 
 duties and obligations are determinants of behaviour
 individuals should engage in group activities
Low risk countries, desire more individualism and believe believe that:
 attitudes and personal needs are determinants of social behaviour
 individuals should engage in activities by themselves
Interestingly, research has shown varying results between this dimension and societal well-being.
Hofstede (1980) found a positive correlation between individualism and wealth, however, Bhawuk,
Bechtol  & Manusami (2003) found that  “collectivism, not  individualism,  is  more predictive of
wealth” (as cited in Gelfand et al, 2004, p.451). Diener, Diener & Diener (1995) found a positive
correlation between individualism and health, whereas, Sinha & Verma (1994) found “a positive
association between allocentrism and psychological well-being” (as cited in Gelfand et al, 2004,
p.451). With this in mind, then it is possible to say that whilst this dimension may be a driver in the
communication of dissatisfaction, it must be taken in context with the situation. We explore this
further in the ‘mean of findings’ below.
Uncertainty Avoidance is extent to which people feel threatened by ambiguity and will avoid it by
establishing and following societal rules. Our data showed that very low risk countries all wanted
less  of  this  dimension.  Low risk  countries  were  mixed  but  the  majority  want  less  uncertainty
avoidance. Middle risk countries were mixed with the majority wanting more of this dimension.
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High  risk  and  very  high  risk  countries  showed  a  positive  gap  movement  between  values  and
practices, showing that they also want more of this dimension. Put simply, this indicated that people
in high risk countries wanted less uncertainty whereas people in low risk countries tolerated this
ambiguity and if anything desired more of it by desiring a life which is less predictable. According
to Sully De Luquq & Javidan (2004, p.618) cultures which desire more of this dimension, thus
value:
 formalised rules and procedures
 stricter adherence to procedures and less tolerance to people breaking them
Those cultures which value this dimension less than their current practice, indicate that they want:
 to be less concerned about orderliness
 to be more informal with the people they interact with
This  result  was probably the most  expected because as  Hofstede (2001) confirms  “[p]eople  in
societies create coping mechanisms to handle anxiety produced by excessive uncertainty” (as cited
in Sully De Luquq & Javidan,  2004, p.607).  It  is  understandable that cultures without  a stable
government and/or a formalised welfare system would crave the need to establish predictability in
their lives. Hofstede (2001) continues by discussing three primary mechanisms which help societies
cope with ambiguity, on page 146 he states “[t]echology has helped us to defend ourselves against
uncertainties  caused by nature;  law,  to  defend against  uncertainties  in  the behaviour  of  others;
religion, to accept the uncertainties we cannot defend ourselves against” (as cited in Sully De Luquq
& Javidan, 2004, p.607). In this case, our results would indicate that people in low risk countries
already have  established mechanisms to tolerate  ambiguity and therefore  want  more individual
freedom to be spontaneous, whereas people in high risk countries want security for their future and
don’t want to be vulnerable when the unexpected arises. Research by Arindell et al (1997) support
this where they found that “measures of uncertainty avoidance showed a significant relationship
with subjective well-being, with low uncertainty avoidance related to high levels of subjective well-
being” (as cited in Sully De Luquq & Javidan, 2004, p.604). The trend we found between this
dimension and the risk of social unrest is therefore fully supported by other research. 
Having elaborated on the discussion for the four 'trended' dimensions, we will now discuss the
dimensions which did not present a DCD trend between the gap in expectations and the risk of
social category. 
Power Distance is the degree to which people accept their leader’s decisions without question. We
found  that  whilst  very  low  and  low  risk  countries  did  show  a  desire  for  an  increase  in  this
dimension, the other three risk categories did not show any discernible pattern. We concluded that
the low risk categories were not relevant because no overall trend could be found in this dimension
for contributing to the risk of social unrest. This was a particularly surprising result since it would
be  expected  that  people  in  high  risk  countries  would  want  to  decrease  the  distance  between
themselves and the authorities ruling them. A lesser distance would give people the opportunity to
play  a  part  in  the  decisions  which  affect  them.  As  Carl  et  al.  (2004,  p.515)  state  “the  most
foundational treatment of the concept of power emerged from Maslow’s hierarchy of needs”. This
pyramid structure presents five categories of needs starting with physiological at the foundation,
followed by safety,  social,  esteem and self-actualisation at  the top.  According to Maslow, these
categories can be viewed from the perspective of either gaining or yielding power, in which, “this
yearning was not simply a desire, but rather a fundamental need of mankind” (Carl et al, 2004,
p.515). Once again, it appears that this dimension must be taken in relative context and cannot be
used to analyse the violations of expectations. Carl et al (2004, p.518) confirms this sentiment that,
whilst many cultures bear concerns that “excessive power results in the abuse” of it; in some high
power distance countries, “power distance implies a reciprocal arrangement that has traditionally
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protected the less powerful in a relationship”. 
Assertiveness is the degree to which people are encouraged to be confrontational and decisive. The
results for all 5 risk categories were a mix between desired increases and desired decreases in this
dimension. This dimension clearly shows that the desired value is relative to the society in which it
is being measured. Countries which score low in assertiveness value modesty and tenderness and
those which score high in this dimension value strength and success. The GLOBE study found that
whilst there is a “positive relationship between Assertiveness practices and economic health”; it also
found that “[s]ocieties that score higher on Assertiveness tend to exhibit lower levels of human
health” (Den Hartog, 2004, p.416). The relationships, between this dimension, economic and human
health, are somewhat contradictory to each other. For this reason, the inconclusive results within our
data analysis between assertiveness and the risk of social unrest appear to be complemented by the
puzzling “patterns of relationships unearthed” in the GLOBE study (Den Hartog, 2004, p.433).
Humane Orientation is the degree to which people are tolerant of each other and are encouraged to
be friendly and generous. Our data analysis did not find any correlations between this dimension
and the violation of expectations which can lead to the communication of dissatisfaction. This was
probably the most unexpected of our results as one would expect people in high risk countries to
want an increase in this dimension. Contrary to this expectation is that, as Wolf (1996) discusses, in
some societies “a system of patronage based on relationships of family and friends emerges to fulfil
some needs of individuals” (as cited in Kabasakal & Bodur, 2004, p.566). Whilst it is the norm in
these cultures to rely on the family unit, it means that that the state does not need to ensure well
being. As Kabasakal & Bodur (2004, p.568) comment, in many developed nations “the state takes
the role of at least a minimum standard of guaranteeing well-being of members of society”. This
perplexing  balance  between state  and family in  guaranteeing  well-being,  may mean  that  some
cultures are content with the family unit providing for them and in others, people are content with
the state looking after them. Therefore, there is no visible trend in our results because the dimension
must be taken within the context of the culture. Kabasakal & Bodur (2004) confirm this by listing
two generalizations about this dimension. On page 597, they state “at a societal  level” humane
orientation “seems to increase under more difficult economic, physical, and climatic conditions”
and “in less  humane-orientated  societies,  the  state  more  often  and more  strongly intervenes  to
protect  and  give  social  support”  (Kabasakal  &  Bodur,  2004).  These  statements  are  somewhat
complimentary of our expectations but unexpectedly do not appear to be supported by our results.
In-Group Collectivism assesses the degree to which people express loyalty with the family unit or
‘in-group’. Our analysis did not show any correlation between the violation of expectations in this
dimension  and  the  risk  of  social  unrest.  This  was  to  be  expected  since  some  cultures  value
independence and individuality and others value group membership and collectivism. Regardless of
the culture, the family unit is a fundamental part of society. It is through this unit we develop a
concept of who we are. According to Wood (2002) our identity is built through a combination of
direct definitions such as “You’re such a strong boy”; identity scripts (which function as rules) such
as “We are accountable for our actions”, and attachment styles (for how to approach relationships)
such as “People are in general trustworthy”. Of course, like all of these dimensions, there can be a
great variation between individuals within each culture. It would therefore appear that if people are
dissatisfied with their family and disagree with their values, it is not likely this would develop into a
mass movement driven by people who are not involved nor impacted by this small units decisions.
In contrast to many of the other dimensions which are related to how people view themselves in
relation to institutions and the wider society, this dimension is much more ‘private’. Even if peoples'
expectations are being violated within this dimension then the violator is a friend or family member
and not part of the bigger establishment. This may explain why the dimension does not appear to be
a driver for social unrest. 
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Gender Egalitarianism looks at  how a society minimises  gender  role  differences  and promotes
equality between the sexes. This is an interesting dimension since it showed that the overwhelming
majority  of  countries  regardless  of  risk  category  desire  a  movement  towards  feminine  values.
Emrich et al (2004, p.362) state that “no society in GLOBE is perceived to be female dominated to
the point of, for example, encouraging girls, more so than boys, to attain a higher education or for
having more women than men in positions of high office”. It would be possible to assume that
countries in low risk categories would desire more gender egalitarianism whereas countries in high
risk categories would desire less; however, this is not the case. In fact, Moore & Shackman (1996)
present a perspective which “argues that gender inequality persists or even increases with growth in
industrialization because it stimulates competition between women who are relatively powerless
and men who wish to  retain their  power” (as  cited in Emrich et  al,  2004,  p.355).  In  addition,
monotheism - the belief  in one (male) God - has no doubt impacted women's status in various
cultures. This male figure has afforded men a higher status in society. However, as Elmrich et al
(2004, p.386) argue, “beliefs about appropriate roles for women and men might cause religious
attitudes  rather  than  the  reverse”.  Findings  in  the  GLOBE  study  showed  that  “[m]embers  of
societies that embraced more gender-egalitarianism values expressed a desire for less government”
Elmrich et al (2004, p.387). It should then be possible to conclude that, for varying reasons, this
dimension does not appear to play a role in the risk of social unrest since most societies express a
desire towards increased feminine values.
Meaning of the Findings
We discovered that  four  cultural  dimensions  appear  to  play a  part  in  the  risk of  social  unrest,
whereas the other five did not show any apparent patterns. From these results we can thus make the
following claims. 
 In Performance Orientation, low risk countries express the desire to be less confrontational.
High risk countries wanted to be more competitive.
 In Future Orientation, people in low risk countries generally value immediate gratification
whereas people in high risk countries want a more predictable future and are willing to be
vocal about this need. 
 In  Institutional Collectivism,  people in low risk countries wanted more individuality and
people in high risk countries wanted more collectivism.
 In Uncertainty Avoidance, low risk countries wanted to be more spontaneous and high risk
countries wanted more security in their well-being.
Therefore,  the  results  of  our  DCD  analysis  indicate  that  low  risk  countries  want  to  be  more
individualistic and spontaneous by indulging in immediate gratifications. On the other hand, the
DCD analysis indicated that high risk countries want to be more collectivistic by focusing on their
future security and well-being. Understandably, when it comes to the two methods of expressing
themselves, performance orientation indicates that low risk countries express a value in being less
direct and confrontational whereas  future orientation indicates that high risk countries are more
willing to engage in methods to express their voice. These values alone are conducive with the idea
that people in high risk countries are more likely to engage in the communication of dissatisfaction
about the DCD gap than people in low risk countries. 
As mentioned in the results, some of the trends were expected and others were not.  This study
primarily focuses on the individual dimensions and not the relationships that the trended and non-
trended dimensions have with each other. However, there is one relationship worth discussing and
this  is  the relationship  between  Institutional  Collectivism  and  In-Group  Collectivism.  It  was
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expected that the two 'collectivisms' would have the same trend, either with or without an obvious
DCD pattern. One would think that dependency on the 'in-group' unit would be valued more in high
risk countries since there is less social welfare in many of these societies. However, this was not the
case.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  clear  that  people  in  high  risk  countries  want  more  institutional
collectivism eg. for the state to look after them. What is interesting is that this is in fact a pattern
generally found in Nordic nations. Gelfand et al (2004, p.502) state “Scandinavian nations can score
high on Institutional Collectivism, yet score very low on other forms of In-Group Collectivism”. It
is an interesting juxtaposition of the dimensions and is clearly representative of the values people
hold in many low risk countries (particularly those within Scandinavia). This balance should be a
model  for  how  high  risk  countries  can  maintain  'in-group  collectivism'  and  'institutional
collectivism' as a way of reducing the communication of dissatisfaction. Barinaga (1996) expands
on this concept of how communication reflects the values of culture in her paper “Swedishness
through  lagom: Can words tell us anything about a culture?”. According to Barinaga (1996, p.4)
there is a subtle equilibrium which “pervades the Swedish character in the way of behaving, the
view held of society and of one’s role in it. There is a balance between individualism and social
concern.” Herlitz (1991) states that the Swedish saying Att få vara i fred (To be let in peace), refers
“to the beauty of finding time for oneself” but is “also attentive of others’ need of peace in solitude”
(as  cited  in  Barinaga,  1996,  p.5).  Other  Swedish  terms  include,  Jämlikhet  (equality)  which
encourages  informality  and  flat  hierarchy  in  the  workplace  and Enighet  (consensus)  which
encourages respect between people and their opinions. These statements, which are key Swedish
terms, reflect the balance between individualism and social responsibility. This balance has also
encouraged a social welfare system few others have been able to achieve (Barinaga, 1996, p.10).
Even the language use within Sweden indicates that it  is  a model for the equilibrium between
Institutional  Collectivism  and  In-Group  Collectivism.  The  Swedish  cultural  values  are also
representative of low risk countries. Our research indicates that low risk countries are concerned
about the general well-being of people by offering a welfare system that removes burden from the
family unit.  This  promotes  a  certain  amount  of  individualism.  Our  research  also  indicates  that
people in high risk countries value and desire a balance between independence and collectivism,
which is something Sweden values not only in practical application, but also through the application
of its language.
Relation to Social Science Theories 
There has been little research on the effects of culture at the micro level as a driver of social unrest.
For this reason, we will compare our results to the three communication theories and three social
movements theories presented in the literature review. What we have thus far established is the
cultural drivers - the cultural incentives at an individual level - for the communication of
dissatisfaction. However, we have not yet discussed why a positive DCD gap may lead to social
unrest when a negative DCD gap does not. This, we believe, is a combination and application of the
six theories previously presented in the literature review.
The primary assumption in our investigation proposed that when there is the gap between values
(expectations) and practice (reality), there can be cause for the communication of dissatisfaction.
This is supported by the Expectancy Violation Theory in which people anticipate what will occur in
the future. In both high and low risk countries, there appears to be gap in most dimensions. At this
point  however,  the  Expectancy  Violation  theory  can  not  be  further  applied  since  the  theory
generally proposes that people assign a valance to the experience. For example, those acts which are
unexpected  will  be  viewed  as  favourable  and  better  received  than  those  acts  which  are  also
favourable but expected. The opposite is also true according to EVT. However, we have not yet
discussed why a positive DCD gap may lead to social unrest when a negative DCD gap does not.
We must then turn to the other communication and social movements theories to further explain
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why the  direction  of  the  gap can  lead  to  some countries  being  in  higher  risk of  social  unrest
categories than others.
To address this, we must look at the framing theory within social movements and the attribution
theory within communication. These theories looks at how people ‘frame’ or assign value to 
situations. Our results show that the dimensions with a positive gap score increase the chances of 
social unrest and the dimensions with a negative gap score decrease the chances of social unrest. 
Therefore, as the theories propose, how people perceive the gap is vital. What we propose is that 
when people want more of something, in this case, a cultural value, then they are more likely to 
communicate this dissatisfaction and engage in the later stages of social mobilization than people 
who want less of something. 
Regardless of the direction, as the rational actor theory and social exchange theory propose, people
are invariably going to weigh up the costs and the benefits of engaging in a movement. As the
results in our data show, this may imply that people in low risk countries could potentially lose
more than they would gain by participating in social unrest; whereas people in high risk countries
who already feel frustrated and feel they are entitled to more, may feel like the benefits outweigh
the costs. Therefore there is less incentive for people in low risk countries to  communicate their
dissatisfaction and therefore engage in social unrest, in contrast to people in high risk countries.
Deduction
Our research has investigated all nine dimensions in the GLOBE study and  established a pattern
between four of the dimensions and the risk of social unrest. This was achieved by calculating the
DCD (degree of cultural dissatisfaction) scores for each country and each dimension. These DCD
scores  were  then  categorised  according  to  the  risk  category  which  allowed  us  to  analyse  any
apparent  patterns.  We have investigated the cultural  desires which cause the communication of
dissatisfaction and increase the risk of social unrest. This form of communication is, according to
Jovanović et al (2012, p.44), the first stage in the risk of social unrest. However our findings on the
incentives  at  a  micro  level,  must  not  be  taken  out  of  context  and  separated  from the  macro
environment; such as the political and economical situation within which the communication of
dissatisfaction is occurring. We chose to ignore these two variables and ignore how culture can also
have an impact on them. Yet, we must stress that both economy and politics are undoubtedly drivers
in the risk of social  unrest.  Discussing them was not an objective and for this reason we have
largely dismissed them in our study.  As previously stated we wanted to investigate the role of
culture in affecting values which would thus lead to the communication of dissatisfaction. What has
become clear from this research is that perception and how people 'frame' the situation they are in
has a clear impact on the communication of dissatisfaction.  These frames are “both social  and
individual” (Johnston, 2009, p.25). As the Davies J-Curve (figure 3) suggests, a small gap between
expectations and reality is acceptable but when the gap size increases, the difference between values
and practices becomes unacceptable. What we purpose is that when the political and economical
situation within a society becomes unstable, the four dimensions we found trends in, will contribute
to the communication of dissatisfaction at a micro level, before it incites people to join movements
and communicate their dissatisfaction at a macro level.
What is most important about our research is that it has identified four cultural dimensions which
appear to play a part in the risk of social unrest and these are the values connected to: Performance
Orientation,  Future Orientation,  Institutional Collectivism  and  Uncertainty Avoidance. According
to our findings when the gap becomes unacceptable the values connected to these dimensions may
well be a factor in driving the risk of social unrest. What is clear from this, is that subjective well-
being - the experience people connect with their quality of life - is related to the value people place
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in the 4 dimensions we found trends in. 
Suggestions for Further Research
The premise of our study examined the gap between values and practices in nine different cultural
dimensions and looked at whether this had an impact on the communication of dissatisfaction. Our
research looked at the gap movement but gave little regard to the starting point of each country. A
more  thorough  and  in-depth  analysis,  may  take  the  starting  point  of  cultural  practices  into
consideration. 
This study focused primarily on each dimension individually as a driver of social unrest but we
have written little about the dimensions in relation to each other. We did touch on this by discussing
the two forms of collectivism, yet it is without doubt possible to delve deeper into this and research
how the different dimensions impact each other. 
It would also be interesting to see what results would be found in applying the same methodology to
other indexes of unrest. At this point of our investigation our biggest unanswered question is; if we
were to use another index of social unrest, would the results be the same? To be precise, it would be
very interesting to see if the same four dimensions showed trends with the risk of social unrest as
defined by groups other than the EIU.
In addition, as mentioned in the ‘aim’ of this research, the GLOBE study is a tool primarily used for
measuring  cultural  differences  between  leaders  and  organisations  in  different  societies.
Nevertheless, we chose this study because the GLOBE investigations present two scores, one for
cultural values and one for practices. Many other cultural taxonomies only provide one score for
each dimension and since our study relied heavily on investigating the gap between values and
practices, we decided the GLOBE study was the most suitable data source for our research. We
would suggest that additional research into this gap should use data which was more representative
of the general population and not just middle management. 
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Conclusion
The  communication  of  dissatisfaction  among  people  who  share  similar  experiences  and
expectations  is one very important fundamental element of social unrest; and it  is a phenomenon
that can potentially manifest in any country throughout the world. While the stability of a society in
the short term can be easily predicted; medium and long term predictions can be harder to assess.
Much of the research available on this topic, focuses on the more obvious parameters of economy,
political governance and general welfare. We believe that these are  important factors, yet culture,
as both an individual and national phenomena, is often overlooked. Moreover,  we purpose that
people's cultural expectations can impact the communication of dissatisfaction and eventual risk of
social unrest. Our contention is that for the given set of circumstances according to these mentioned
parameters,  cultural  values  and the  perceived distance  to  those  values,  affect  how people  in  a
society communicate and react to the pressures of economy, politics and other hardships.
Throughout our study, we have shown that there is an apparent connection between some cultural
values and communication of dissatisfaction, which can increase the risk of social unrest. However,
it was challenging to research this since there was little available data on the subject. We hope that
an increase of interest in this field will give rise to the availability of data upon which we can
strengthen our understanding of this subject. We hope the dimensions we discovered can be further
investigated  and  monitored  in  order  to  better  understand  the  nature  and  magnitude  of  their
contribution and covariance with other parameters. A better understanding would lead to new ideas
and actions that could, in the long run, affect the quality of life for many people.
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International
Ripe for rebellion?
Where protest is likeliest to break out
Nov 18th 2013 | From The World In 2014 print edition 
  
From anti-austerity movements to middle-class revolts, in rich countries and in poor, social unrest
has been on the rise around the world. The reasons for the protests vary. Some are direct responses
to economic distress (in Greece and Spain, for example). Others are revolts against dictatorship
(especially in the Middle East). A number also express the aspirations of new middle classes in fast-
growing emerging markets (whether in Turkey or Brazil). But they share some underlying features.
The common backdrop is the 2008-09 financial crisis and its aftermath. Economic distress is almost
a necessary condition for serious social or political instability, but it is not a sufficient one. Declines
in income and high unemployment are not always followed by unrest. Only when economic trouble
is accompanied by other elements of vulnerability is there a high risk of instability. Such factors
include wide income-inequality, poor government, low levels of social provision, ethnic tensions
and a history of unrest. Of particular importance in sparking unrest in recent times appears to have
been an erosion of trust in governments and institutions: a crisis of democracy.
Trust has been in secular decline throughout the rich world since the 1970s. This trend accelerated
and spread after the collapse of communism in 1989. And as opinion polls have documented, it has
sped up again since the 2008–09 financial crisis.
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65 countries will be at a high or very high risk
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a sister company of  The Economist, measures the risk of
social unrest in 150 countries around the world. It places a heavy emphasis on institutional and
political  weaknesses.  And  recent  developments  have  indeed  revealed  a  deep  sense  of  popular
dissatisfaction with political elites and institutions in many emerging markets.
The protesters in Turkey in 2013, for example, were dissatisfied with some abrupt decisions by
Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan’s  government.  In  Bulgaria,  what  started  off  as  protests  against  higher
electricity bills turned into generalised anti-government demonstrations complaining of corruption
—and led to the fall of the government. Protests have continued.
What to expect in 2014? The recession is now over or has eased in much of the world. Yet political
reactions to economic distress have historically come with a lag. Austerity is still on the agenda in
2014 in many countries and this will fuel social unrest.
Restlessness on the rise
According to the EIU’s ratings, 65 countries (43% of the 150) will be at a high or very high risk of
social unrest in 2014. For 54 countries the risk of instability is medium and for the remaining 31
countries it is low or very low. Compared with five years ago, 19 more countries are now in the
high-risk categories.
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), southern Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are well represented in the high-risk
categories: 12 out of 18 MENA states, six of the seven Balkan countries, eight out of the 12 CIS
states, five out of six southern European ones. More than 40% of the countries in eastern Europe are
in the high-risk categories. This region was hit hard by the financial crisis and also has many of the
underlying characteristics associated with unrest. Unsurprisingly, many high-risk countries are in
sub-Saharan Africa.  But there are also some in Latin America and Asia—including the world’s
largest and most successful emerging market, China, where the authorities are perennially nervous
about the risk of mass protests.
Laza Kekic: director, country forecasting services, Economist Intelligence Unit
From The World In 2014 print edition 
Appendix B - http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=instability_map&page=noads
Manning the barricades
The Political Instability Index shows the level of threat posed to governments by social protest. Of
165 countries covered, nearly half are judged either high or very high risk. The index covers the
period 2009/10.
‘Roll over’ the country outlines to see the country name, the index score and the associated risk
level.
 See data in a table 
 Full methodology 
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Appendix C - http://viewswire.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=VWArticleVW3&article_id=874361472
Political Instability Index: Vulnerability to social and political unrest 
March 19th 2009 
Our index draws on recent  insights  of the political  science literature that seeks to identify and
quantify the main social, economic and political factors and traits that are causally associated with,
or that can predict, political instability. In particular, it draws on the work of the so-called Political
Instability Task Force (PITF) based at George Mason University in the US. The PITF has created a
simple model that has a rate of success of over 80% in identifying, ex post, outbreaks of serious
instability for a data set that stretches back to 1955.
These attempts to predict the occurrence of unrest on the basis of quantitative models was borne of
a dissatisfaction with the experience of traditional, qualitative analysis and assessments, which have
had a poor record in predicting outbreaks of social and political turmoil. Some recent analyses have
pointed  to  the  need  to  combine  quantitative  models  with  traditional  qualitative  assessment  by
country experts. Although quantitative models have greater predictive success, they can miss out
possibly pertinent specific features in countries that are not captured by the general model and the
data that the model uses may also contain errors or may not always be up to date.
The final PITF model that had the greatest predictive power is a simple model that is based on only
four factors: the level of development as measured by the infant mortality rate; extreme cases of
economic or political discrimination against minorities (according to assessments and codings by
the Minorities at Risk Project); "a bad neighbourhood" (if a country has at least four neighbours that
suffered  violent  conflicts);  and regime type  (intermediate  regimes  that  are  neither  consolidated
democracies  nor  autocratic  regimes  combined  with  the  existence  in  these  regimes  of  intense
factionalism in domestic politics, as coded by the Polity Project on democracy). Although over 80%
of outbreaks of instability could be predicted (a very high "hit rate"), the model cannot predict the
intensity or duration of the instability, or its exact timing.
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We also look and measure other factors associated with instability that have been identified in the
literature, such as inequality, a prior history of instability, ethnic fragmentation, poor governance, a
proclivity to labour unrest, the level of provision of public services and state strength.
Economic  distress  and  dislocation  tend  to  be  associated  causally  with  instability,  that  is  they
precede, not only accompany, instability. Indeed, of the 50 cases of instability (instances of "adverse
regime change") identified since 1980 by the PITF (about one-half of these were in Africa), in the
vast majority of cases (46) the country that had an outbreak of instability had suffered a decline in
GDP per head in at least one of the two years prior to the occurrence of instability.
Economic distress appears to be almost a necessary condition for serious instability, but it is not a
sufficient one. There are many instances of declines in GDP per head that have not been followed
by political instability. It is only when economic distress is accompanied by other, underlying or
structural features of vulnerability that there is a high vulnerability to or risk of serious outbreaks of
political and social unrest.
Defining political unrest
We define  social  and political  unrest  or  upheaval  as  those events  or  developments  that  pose a
serious  extra-parliamentary or  extra-institutional  threat  to  governments  or  the  existing  political
order.  The  events  will  almost  invariably  be  accompanied  by some  violence  as  well  as  public
disorder.  These  need  not  necessarily  be  successful  in  the  sense  that  they  end  up  toppling  a
government or regime. Even unsuccessful episodes result in turmoil and serious disruption. The
assessment of what constitutes a "serious threat" still requires judgment and can be arbitrary, but
this is a step forward from having no definition at all.
Political Instability Index
The overall index on a scale of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) has two component
indexes—an index of underlying vulnerability and an economic distress index. The overall index is
a  simple  average  of  the  two  component  indexes.  There  are  15  indicators  in  all—12  for  the
underlying and 3 for the economic distress index.
I. Underlying vulnerability
1. Inequality
Measured by Gini coefficient
0 if lower than 40
1 if 40-50
2 if higher than 50
Sources:  World  Bank,  World  Development  Indicators  2008;  Economist  Intelligence  Unit
estimates.
2. State history
Measured according to date of independence
0 if before 1900
1 if between 1900 and 1950
2 if after 1950
58
Source: CIA, Factbook.
3. Corruption
Economist Intelligence Unit ratings
0 for low
1 for moderate
2 for high
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
4. Ethnic fragmentation
Ethnic fractionalisation index (0 to 100 scale)
0 if lower than 30
1 if 30 to 50
2 if higher than 50
Source: Alesina Alberto et al, "Fractionalization", NBER Working Paper 9411, 2003.
5. Trust in institutions
Percentage of population that trusts/has confidence in parliament
0 if more than 50%
1 30-50%
2 if less than 30%
Sources: The Euro, Latino, Africa and Asia Barometer polls; World Values Survey.
6. Status of minorities
High rates of economic or political discrimination against minorities. Based on latest available
assessment  and  scoring  on  0  (no  discrimination)  to  4  (extreme  discrimination)  scale  by
Minorities at Risk Project (MRP). The MRP defines extreme discrimination (score of 4) if any
minority group is subject to public policies that constitute formal exclusion and/or recurring
repression,  and  that  substantially  restrict  the  groups'  economic  opportunities  or  political
participation. There is significant discrimination (score of 3) if minority group suffers from
significant poverty and under-representation owing to prevailing social practices by dominant
group.
0 if low or no discrimination (MRP scores lower than 3)
1 if significant discrimination (if score of 3 by for any minority by MRP)
2 if extreme discrimination (if score of 4 for any minority by MRP)
7. History of political instability
Significant episodes or events of political instability (regime change) as recorded by Political
Instability Task Force (PITF)
0 if no recorded episode
1 if one major episode
2 if two or more episodes
Source: PITF database.
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8. Proclivity to labour unrest 
Risk of labour unrest
0 if low
1 if moderate
2 if high
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk Briefing.
9. Level of social provision
Measured on the basis  of  the  "expected" infant  mortality rate;  based on residuals  from a
regression of the natural logarithm of the infant mortality rate on the logarithm of GPP per
head US$ at purchasing power parity (PPP) for 2006.
0 if the actual infant mortality rate is lower than predicted, or if the actual rate does not
exceed the predicted rate by a significant margin
1 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.1 but less than
1.5
2 if ratio between actual and predicted infant mortality rate is greater than 1.5
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008.
10
. A country's neighbourhood
Based on the average vulnerability index (calculated on the basis of all indicators except the
neighbourhood indicator) for all of the country's geographic neighbours.
0 if index is less than 5.8
1 if index is 5.8 to 6.3
2 if index is higher than 6.3
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
11
. Regime type
Based on classification of political regimes, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit's
Index of Democracy
0 if either a full democracy or authoritarian regime
2 if  either  a  non-consolidated,  "flawed"  democracy  or  a  hybrid  regime  (neither  a
democracy nor an autocracy)
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
12
. Regime type and factionalism
The interaction of regime type with the existence of political factionalism (according to Polity
IV database). According to Polity, factionalism is defined as polities with parochial (possibly,
but  not  necessarily,  ethnic-based)  political  factions  that  regularly  compete  for  political
influence to promote particularist agendas and favour heavily group members to the detriment
of a common agenda.
4 if a country is both an intermediate regime and suffers from factionalism
0 if not
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II. Economic distress
1. Growth in incomes
Growth in real GDP per head in 2009
0 if forecast growth in real GDP per head is positive, with minimal risks that it could be
negative
1 if a fall in GDP per head is forecast or there is a significant risk of that occurring, but the
decline is less than by 4%
2 if a forecast decline in GDP per head is greater than by 4% or there is a significant risk
that this could occur
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
2. Unemployment
Unemployment rate, %.
0 if forecast unemployment rate is less than 6% and there are only minimal risks that it
could be higher than 6%
1 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 6% or there is a significant risk of that
occurring, but the rate does not surpass 10%
2 if a forecast unemployment rate is higher than 10% or there is a significant risk that this
could occur
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit; International Labour Organisation.
3. Level of income per head
Measured by GDP per head at PPP, US$ in 2007, on the assumption that richer countries can
more easily withstand economic distress
0 if more than US$12,000
1 if between US$3,000 and US$12,000
2 if less than US$3,000
Notes:  In  the  compilation  of  the  economic  distress  sub-index,  growth  in  GDP per  head  and
unemployment have weights of 40% each, and GDP per head has a weight of 20%. 
Appendix D - http://viewswire.eiu.com/site_info.asp?info_name=social_unrest_table&page=noads
Social unrest
The Political Instability Index shows the level of threat posed to governments by social protest.
The  index  scores  are  derived  by  combining  measures  of  economic  distress  and  underlying
vulnerability to unrest. The index covers the period 2009/10, and scores are compared with results
for 2007.
  
Rank Country Underlying
vulnerability
Economic
distress
Index
score
 2007
score
1 Zimbabwe 7.5 10.0 8.8  8.8
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2 Chad 7.1 10.0 8.5  7.5
3 Congo  (DemocraticRepublic) 8.3 8.0 8.2  7.2
4 Cambodia 7.9 8.0 8.0  6.0
4 Sudan 7.9 8.0 8.0  7.0
6 Iraq 8.8 7.0 7.9  7.9
7 Cote d'Ivoire 7.5 8.0 7.8  7.8
7 Haiti 7.5 8.0 7.8  6.8
7 Pakistan 7.5 8.0 7.8  5.8
7 Zambia 7.5 8.0 7.8  6.8
7 Afghanistan 7.5 8.0 7.8  6.8
7 Central  AfricanRepublic 7.5 8.0 7.8  5.8
13 North Korea 5.4 10.0 7.7  3.7
14 Bolivia 8.3 7.0 7.7  5.7
14 Ecuador 8.3 7.0 7.7  6.7
16 Angola 6.3 9.0 7.6  5.6
16 Dominican Republic 6.3 9.0 7.6  5.6
16 Ukraine 6.3 9.0 7.6  4.6
19 Bangladesh 7.1 8.0 7.5  4.5
19 Guinea 7.1 8.0 7.5  6.5
19 Kenya 7.1 8.0 7.5  6.5
19 Moldova 7.1 8.0 7.5  4.5
19 Senegal 7.1 8.0 7.5  6.5
19 Guinea Bissau 7.1 8.0 7.5  6.5
19 Nepal 7.1 8.0 7.5  6.5
19 Niger 7.1 8.0 7.5  5.5
27 Bosnia  andHercegovina 7.9 7.0 7.5  6.5
28 Liberia 8.8 6.0 7.4  5.4
29 Venezuela 6.7 8.0 7.3  4.3
29 Timor Leste 6.7 8.0 7.3  4.3
31 Sri Lanka 7.5 7.0 7.3  4.3
32 Sierra Leone 8.3 6.0 7.2  5.2
33 Argentina 6.3 8.0 7.1  4.1
33 Kyrgyz Republic 6.3 8.0 7.1  5.1
33 Madagascar 6.3 8.0 7.1  6.1
33 Myanmar 6.3 8.0 7.1  4.1
33 Panama 6.3 8.0 7.1  5.1
33 Tajikistan 6.3 8.0 7.1  6.0
39 Colombia 7.1 7.0 7.0  6.0
39 Lebanon 7.1 7.0 7.0  5.0
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39 Peru 7.1 7.0 7.0  6.0
39 South Africa 7.1 7.0 7.0  4.0
39 Thailand 7.1 7.0 7.0  6.0
44 Lesotho 7.9 6.0 7.0  6.0
44 Nigeria 7.9 6.0 7.0  7.0
44 Mali 7.9 6.0 7.0  5.9
47 Burkina Faso 5.8 8.0 6.9  6.9
47 Burundi 5.8 8.0 6.9  5.9
47 Cameroon 5.8 8.0 6.9  4.9
47 Papua New Guinea 5.8 8.0 6.9  5.9
47 Mauritania 5.8 8.0 6.9  3.8
52 Honduras 6.7 7.0 6.8  4.8
52 Indonesia 6.7 7.0 6.8  3.8
54 Philippines 4.6 9.0 6.8  4.8
55 Turkey 7.5 6.0 6.8  5.7
56 Eritrea 5.4 8.0 6.7  2.7
56 Estonia 5.4 8.0 6.7  5.7
56 Gambia 5.4 8.0 6.7  2.7
56 Latvia 5.4 8.0 6.7  5.7
60 Guyana 8.3 5.0 6.7  5.6
61 Algeria 6.3 7.0 6.6  4.6
61 Guatemala 6.3 7.0 6.6  5.6
61 Macedonia 6.3 7.0 6.6  3.5
64 Malaysia 7.1 6.0 6.5  6.5
64 Uganda 7.1 6.0 6.5  3.5
66 Russia 5.0 8.0 6.5  3.4
67 Paraguay 5.8 7.0 6.4  3.4
67 Romania 5.8 7.0 6.4  5.4
67 Serbia 5.8 7.0 6.4  5.4
67 Montenegro 5.8 7.0 6.4  3.3
71 Greece 4.6 8.0 6.3  3.3
71 Uzbekistan 4.6 8.0 6.3  8.3
73 Congo (Brazzaville) 7.5 5.0 6.3  6.3
73 Georgia 7.5 5.0 6.3  5.2
75 Albania 5.4 7.0 6.2  4.2
75 Belize 5.4 7.0 6.2  5.2
75 Iran 5.4 7.0 6.2  3.2
75 Turkmenistan 5.4 7.0 6.2  5.1
79 Croatia 6.3 6.0 6.1  4.1
79 Equatorial Guinea 6.3 6.0 6.1  3.1
79 Mexico 6.3 6.0 6.1  5.1
79 Yemen 6.3 6.0 6.1  3.1
63
83 Hungary 4.2 8.0 6.1  2.1
83 Lithuania 4.2 8.0 6.1  4.1
83 Saudi Arabia 4.2 8.0 6.1  3.1
83 Mongolia 4.2 8.0 6.1  4.0
87 Bulgaria 5.0 7.0 6.0  4.0
87 Jamaica 5.0 7.0 6.0  3.9
89 Benin 5.8 6.0 5.9  4.9
89 Ghana 5.8 6.0 5.9  3.9
89 Nicaragua 5.8 6.0 5.9  5.9
89 Tanzania 5.8 6.0 5.9  4.8
93 Namibia 6.7 5.0 5.8  4.8
94 Armenia 4.6 7.0 5.8  3.8
94 Syria 4.6 7.0 5.8  4.7
96 Malawi 5.4 6.0 5.7  4.7
96 Mozambique 5.4 6.0 5.7  5.6
98 Morocco 6.3 5.0 5.6  4.5
99 Bahrain 5.0 6.0 5.5  4.5
99 Cape Verde 5.0 6.0 5.5  2.5
99 Israel 5.0 6.0 5.5  3.5
99 Kuwait 5.0 6.0 5.5  3.5
99 Slovakia 5.0 6.0 5.5  2.5
104 Spain 2.9 8.0 5.5  4.4
105 Brazil 5.8 5.0 5.4  4.4
106 Egypt 3.8 7.0 5.4  4.4
106 Jordan 3.8 7.0 5.4  5.3
108 Togo 4.6 6.0 5.3  3.3
108 Bhutan 4.6 6.0 5.3  2.3
110 France 2.5 8.0 5.3  1.3
110 Iceland 2.5 8.0 5.3  1.3
110 United  States  ofAmerica 2.5 8.0 5.3  3.2
113 Azerbaijan 5.4 5.0 5.2  4.2
113 El Salvador 5.4 5.0 5.2  3.2
115 Uruguay 3.3 7.0 5.2  4.1
116 Gabon 6.3 4.0 5.1  3.1
117 Chile 4.2 6.0 5.1  4.1
117 Ethiopia 4.2 6.0 5.1  4.1
117 Laos 4.2 6.0 5.1  2.1
117 South Korea 4.2 6.0 5.1  2.0
121 Italy 2.1 8.0 5.0  4.9
122 Rwanda 5.8 4.0 4.9  3.9
123 Portugal 1.7 8.0 4.8  1.8
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124 Belarus 4.6 5.0 4.8  2.8
124 China 4.6 5.0 4.8  3.8
124 Kazakhstan 4.6 5.0 4.8  3.8
127 Botswana 5.4 4.0 4.7  2.7
127 Swaziland 5.4 4.0 4.7  4.2
127 Trinidad and Tobago 5.4 4.0 4.7  2.7
130 Malta 3.3 6.0 4.7  2.7
130 Singapore 3.3 6.0 4.7  1.7
132 Ireland 1.3 8.0 4.6  0.6
132 United Kingdom 1.3 8.0 4.6  0.6
134 Tunisia 4.2 5.0 4.6  4.6
135 India 5.0 4.0 4.5  4.5
136 Poland 2.9 6.0 4.5  3.5
137 Libya 4.6 4.0 4.3  2.3
137 Sao Tome & Principe 4.6 4.0 4.3  4.3
139 Taiwan 2.5 6.0 4.3  1.3
139 Vietnam 2.5 6.0 4.3  2.3
141 Cuba 3.3 5.0 4.2  2.2
142 Cyprus 4.2 4.0 4.1  2.1
142 Qatar 4.2 4.0 4.1  4.1
142 Seychelles 4.2 4.0 4.1  5.1
142 United Arab Emirates 4.2 4.0 4.1  2.1
146 Belgium 2.1 6.0 4.0  2.0
146 Hong Kong 2.1 6.0 4.0  1.0
146 Netherlands 2.1 6.0 4.0  1.0
149 Oman 3.8 4.0 3.9  2.9
150 Germany 1.7 6.0 3.8  1.8
150 Japan 1.7 6.0 3.8  0.8
150 Slovenia 1.7 6.0 3.8  1.8
153 Czech Republic 3.3 4.0 3.7  2.7
154 Australia 1.3 6.0 3.6  0.6
154 Austria 1.3 6.0 3.6  0.6
154 Luxembourg 1.3 6.0 3.6  0.6
154 New Zealand 1.3 6.0 3.6  0.6
158 Costa Rica 2.1 5.0 3.5  1.5
158 Mauritius 2.1 5.0 3.5  2.5
160 Switzerland 0.8 6.0 3.4  0.4
161 Finland 0.4 6.0 3.2  1.2
161 Sweden 0.4 6.0 3.2  1.2
163 Canada 1.7 4.0 2.8  1.8
164 Denmark 0.4 4.0 2.2  0.2
165 Norway 0.4 2.0 1.2  0.2
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